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development of the computer model; they were ably assisted by Ms. Elizabeth
Battino.
The authors wish to recognize Israel Taback of Bionetics Corporation
for his contributions to all aspects of the work.
Wealso wish to thank the Project Officers, Dr. Wolf Elber and Mr.
Robert J. Huston, of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Langley
Research Center, for their interest and suggestions during the course of this
work.

EXECUTIVESUMMARY
BACKGROUND
Carbon fibers bonded in epoxy constitute one of today's "miracle"
structural materials. For particular applications structural components can
be designed with great strength, while being considerably lighter than the
conventional parts they replace. Carbon fiber composite material has been
used to date in sporting goods and military aircraft primarily. Limited near-
term use in civil aircraft is expected to grow considerably in the future.
The material is also expected to be used in automobiles. In view of the many
potential applications of carbon-fiber composites considerable concern was
engendered as the result of evidence that individual fiber segments could
cause electrical and electronic equipment to fail under certain operating
conditions. Such individual fiber segments could be released, for example,
in a fire involving the composite material. As a result of this concern a
national multi-agency program was established under the aegis of the Office
of Science and Technology Policy. In this program the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration was assigned the responsibility of examing the risk
due to possible accidents and fire involving civil aircraft, with carbon fiber
composite structural components.
The scenario envisaged in the NASA-funded ORI investigation is:
o A commercial jet aircraft in an accident with fire leading
to ...
O Release of substantial numbers of individual carbon fiber seg-
ments which ...
• Are carried far from the accident scene by prevailing winds
and ...
• Enter buildings and parked aircraft in their path causing ...
• Failures of electrical and electronic equipment resulting in ..
• Economic impact
In order to examine the potential magnitude of the omerall effect ORI, Inc
developed a computer simulation model which replicates these events as far as
possible. In its final Phase I Report, published in May 1979 ORI described
its initial modeling effort and presented the results obtained from a large
number of simulation runs for nine major airports in the United States, using
the best estimates available for all required input data. The airport results
were combined statistically to obtain an estimate of the total national risk. w
In Phase II the ORI airPort risk assessment model was extended in
several respects, principally to increase the variance -- i.e. improve the o
likelihood that extreme values would be generated. Additional experimental
data made available by other NASA-sponsored efforts were used in the new
calculations. A new national risk model was developed; it was designed to be
more useful for estimating the statistical confidence that can be assigned
to the results. An essentially independent study was mounted to assess the
risk to the electric power distribution system.
SINGLE AIRPORTRISK ASSESSMENT
Method
The method used to estimate the risk associated with accidents in-
volving aircraft with carbon fiber composite structural components is essentially
a Monte Carlo simulation model. The method requires the generation of many
aircraft accidents, with variables used in the calculation drawn at random
from defined probability instructions. The impact of each accident is cal-
culated and saved; after many accidents have been simulated the model computes
several statistical measures from the results of all the accidents. The
method is illustrated schematically in Figure I.
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The principal elements or submodels in the improved ORI Phase II
Risk Assessment Model are:
e Randomaccident generation. For each replication, comprising o
a year's accidents, the model first determines, using appropriate
stochastic methods, the actual number of accidents for each
size aircraft. The mean annual fire-accident rate is based on
the analysis of historical accident data conducted by the major
airframers. This submodel makes use of aircraft manufacturers'
projections of increased use of carbon fiber composite material
in individual aircraft, and the changes in the fleet mix between
now and 1993, the target year for the risk assessment. The air-
framers also prepared a detailed analysis of historical jet air-
craft accidents involving fires, which provided critical inputs
describing accident impact. This submodel randomly selects the
aircraft involved in each simulated accident, based on the pro-
jected fleet mix - and randomly determines the extent of damage to
the aircraft. The location is also determined by drawing a random
sample from a distribution obtained from the historical data.
• For the specific accident characteristic the resulting fire
plume is modelled using standard methods. This determines the
height to which the fibers are carried.
• An improved Phase II transport and diffusion calculation deter-
mines the concentration of individual fibers at selected repre-
sentative points downwind from the accident scene. Weather vari-
ables used in the calculation are selected at random from
historical data for each airport.
• County-based data are used to describe the numbers of each type
of vulnerable business and industrial facility, and housing patterns
within a 50-mile range of the airport in all directions.
• Each household, and each size and type of business facility is
characterized by a specific type of building or other structure.
A transfer submodel determines the fraction of fibers outside
the building, determined in the transport and diffusion calcula-
tion, that gets inside the building.
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e For eachtypeand sizeof businessat riska productionmodel
describesthe powerflowfor thattypeof business. Thispro-
ductionmodelis usedwith the interiordosageand equipment
failureinputs,basedon currentexperimentaldata,to deter-
minewhichequipmentsfail,and the resultingimpacton each
business.A similarcalculationis made for each classof
vulnerableaircraftat theairportitself.
e Repaircostsare computedforeach pieceof equipmentthatfails
in the parkedaircraft,and in eachbusinessand industrial
facility. In addition,we determineon a stochasticbasisthose
businessestablishmentsthatcloseas a resultof the cumulative
effectsof individualequipmentfailures.The economicimpact
of suchclosingsis determinedby allocatingto each business
establishmentits share,basedon payroll,of the GrossDomestic
Productfor the particulartypeof businessrepresentedby that
establishment.
The methodsbrieflydescribedaboveare appliedrepetitivelyto a
largenumberof randomlygeneratedaccidentsat one airport. The resultis
the developmentof a set of accidentimpactcostsformany replicationsof the
year 1993at each airport. Theseresultsare thenexaminedto providestatistical
measuresof the risk. Sampleresultsare describedbelow.
Results
The averageannualimpact(in 1976dollars)and the averageimpact
per accidentfor eachof the airportsanalyzedin the standard1993scenario,
are summarizedin TableI. The averageimpactover all simulatedaccidents
(about2250)at all airportsis $5 for householdequipmentdamage,$172for
businessand industryequipmentrepairand businessdislocation,and lessthan
one dollarfor repairof damagedavionicsequipment.In additionto themean
values,the analysisof the simulationresultsprovidesconsiderablestatistical
insightintothe results. Forexample,themost costlyaccidentsgenerated
. at any of the airports,for eachof the majorimpactcategorieswere:
$2,665in householddamage: KennedyAirport,New York
$274,000in business/industrialimpact: LoganAirport,Boston
TABLE 1
SUMMARYOF INDIVIDUAL AIRPORTRISK ASSESSMENTRESULTS- 1993
Mean Impact per Mean Annual
Airport Accident ($) Impact ($)
O'Hare/Chicago 169 17
John F. Kennedy/New York City 212 15
WashingtonNational Airport/Washington, D.C. 315 12
Lambert/St. Louis 69 3
LaGuardia/New York City 384 24
Logan/Boston 153 9
Hartsfield/Atlanta 73 8
Miami International/Miami 31 2 .
Philadelphia International/Philadelphia. 200 8
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$3,910 in avionics equipment damage: Kennedy Airport, New York.
These results are from a total of approximately 2500 simulated accidents at
each of the airports, or from a total of more than 22,500 accidents simulated
at all airports.
A risk profile prepared from the computer-generated results for
Washington National Airport appears in Figure 2. It shows that, although
the average annual cost resulting from these accidents is $12, there is
some chance of exceeding this figure by a considerable amount. However, the
probability that the annual impact will exceed $I00,000 is only .00003 (3 in
I00,000). Expressed another way this implies that costs of this magnitude
might be incurred once every 33,333 years, on the average.* The computed
statistical confidence limits applied to these results indicate that we can be
quite confident that the statistical uncertainties inherent in the computer
simulation method would not cause us to raise these probabilities significantly.
In addition to the purely statistical uncertainty involved, the
model was also used to examine the sensitivity of the results to possible input
data errors. This can be done relatively easily by changing particular input
data elements and rerunning the model. Several such sensitivity tests were
conducted; none indicate that the impact of input errors or changes in assump-
tions would require us to significantly change our conclusions regarding the
nature of the risk. An example of one rather drastic sensitivity calculation
is the one conducted for O'Hare Airport. In this case we changed the inputs
to reflect an assumption that all aircraft with composite operating at O'Hare
were loaded -- that is: they were all heavy jets with 15,619 kilograms of com-
posite material onboard. In our standard 1993 fleet this aircraft only com-
prises about a half of one percent of the aircraft with carbon fiber composite
components. The average amount of composite on the 'standard' 1993 aircraft
with carbon fiber composite aboard is about 2800 kilograms. This worst-case
O'Hare Airport risk profile is compared with the standard case in Figure 3.
The result shows that, even in this "worst case", the probability of exceeding
an annual impact of $I00,000 is approximately .003 (3 in I000) at the nation's
*Since the likelihood of more than one accident at the airport in one year is
very small, this may be safely paraphrased as: "one such accident might occur
every 33,333 years, on the average."
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busiest airport. The results also show that the mean annual impact increased
by a factor of ten from $17 for the standard aircraft mix to $172 for all air-
craft "loaded" with CF.
NATIONALRISK
In order to estimate the total national risk due to release of CF
in an aircraft fire-accident, and the subsequent damage to electric and
electronic equipment, we assumed that the nine airports encompassed all of the
commercial aircraft activity in the United States. This greatly overestimates
the risk since these tend to be busy airports with considerable surrounding busi-
business and industry. The model generates a random number of accidents with
fire occuring in the entire United States, based on the mean values determined
in the previously-referred to airframers' analysis of historical accidents.
The individual accidents are assigned to one of the airports previously analyzed
according to the relative traffic level at that airport. The impact of that
accident is obtained by randomly drawing one of the accidents that was pre-
viously simulated at that airport. The result is a conservative estimate (that
is -- on the high side) of the national risk, in that accidents will not be
allocated to other low-risk airports. The resulting national annual risk pro-
file is shown in Figure 4. A summary of the results also appears in Table 2,
where we have separated out the avionics equipment impact because of special
interest in that aspect of the risk assessment. The risk profile may be inter-
preted as showing that the probability of exceeding $I00,000 in annual impact
is approximately .00015; the estimated probability of exceeding an economic
impact of $I,000,000 is less that than .00001. (one year out of a hundred
thousand) The tests of statistical confidence and the sensitivity tests con-
ducted during the study indicate that we may be confident that these results
are statistically valid and conservative, in that they tend to overestimate
the actual risk.
IMPACTON ELECTRICUTILITY SYSTEMS
Parallel efforts, primarily under the sponsorship of the Department
of Energy, investigated the vulnerability of electrical transmission equipment
to carbon fiber incursion. These indicated some vulnerability of individual
components in the electrical distribution system, but tend to show that high
high voltage (above 38 kilovolts) and low voltage systems (below 2.4 kilovolts)
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are both essentially invulnerable. In the risk assessment model described
above, the vulnerability of equipment in the intermediate range was accounted
for in specific cases by examining the probability of failure of stepdown trans-
formers for specific industrial facilities. At NASA's request ORI conducted a
separate analysis to estimate the impact of possible aircraft-fire accident
on the total national electric power distribution system; this was conducted
in parallel with a historical review of electrical power outage data.
In order to conduct the analysis, typical and actual distribution
systems operating in the vulnerable voltage range were defined. Estimates
of the effects of carbon fibers on the circuits were based on experimental
data made available to ORI by the Department of Energy team under NASAauspices.
In order to be conservative this calculation assumed a downwind pattern of
carbon fiber exposure based on a combination of parameters defined as the
worst possible case. Individual insulator and bushing failure probabilities
are based on these worst case exposure values and experimental failure data
for these components.
The results were obtained for several sets of conditions. The cir-
cuits examined include a typical (textbook) electrical distribution circuit
operating in the 7.5 KV range, and an actual suburban system provided by an
operating electric utility system in the 23 KV range. For the typical cir-
cuit, failures were computed based on published component reliability data, and
the worst-case carbon fiber scenario. For the 23 KV circuit we obtained actual
reported outages, and also computed the worst-case carbon fiber scenario
failures. In all cases the failures were extrapolated to a national base,
assuming that all users were served by the system under examination, and using
the national average annual number of carbon fiber aircraft-fire accidents for
1993. The results are summarized in Table 3. As a further comparision we
note that annual bulk outages reported to the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mision indicate that, typically, 3,000,000 (3 x 106) customers suffer an
outage in one year for an annual average of about 0.05 outages per utility
customer. Such bulk outages comprise an interruption occuring at 69KV and
above and resulting in a loss of at least I00 megawatts for at least 15 minutes,
or a loss of more than one half of a small system's annual peak load. These
outages clearly comprise only a fraction of the total outages in the nation.
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TABLE3
COMPARISONOF ANNUALACTUALAND "NORMAL"ELECTRICPOWERDISTRIBUTION
SYSTEMOUTAGESWITH WORST-CASECARBONFIBER RELATEDOUTAGES
o Measure DistributionCircuit
Typical: 7.5 Kv Actual: 23 Kv
"Normal" Worst-CaseCF Reported Worst-CaseCF
TotalNational
Outagesper Year 22 x lO6 23 140 x lO6 3300
Annual Outages
per Customer 0.32 10-6 2.1 5 x 10-5
All of the carbon-fiber related outage results are based on assump-
tions that are all on the conservative side; that is, they overestimate the
resulting number of expected power outages. The result is that we can expect
less than one civil aircraft fire-accident carbon fiber release related power
outage for about every 200,000 to million outages that occur for a variety of
other reasons.
Clearly, then, we conclude that the carbon fibers potentially released
in a civil aircraft accident with fire represent a relatively insignificant
threat to the electric power distribution network.
xiii
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I. INTRODUCTION
This is the Final ORI Report on Phase II of its Civil Aviation Car-
, bon Fiber Risk Assessment study performed for the National Aeronautics and
Space Agency under Contract No. NASI-15379. The NASA-funded effort is part
of a major national program directed toward estimating the potential risk
of increased use of carbon fiber composite material in a variety of applica-
tions. This program was initiated as the result of evidence that electrical
and electronic equipment may fail as the result of the deposit of carbon fibers
released by burning of the composite material. Carbon fiber - expoy composite
materials offer considerable advantage over more conventional material due to
the ability to engineer in superior strength while achieving a considerable
weight saving. The national program was established to investigate the nature
of this potential hazard in the light of projected increased use of these
materials. The NASAprogram, of which the ORI investigation reported here is
a small part, is directed particularly at the possible risk associated with the
use of carbon fiber composite materials in civil aviation.
In Phase I of its investigation ORI developed a computer simulation
model that was used to generate risk statistics for accidents at several air-
#.
ports, which were later combined to estimate the national risk. The Phase I
model, although using many Monte Carlo - or stochastic - submodels, did compute
the business-industry impact on an expected value basis. This may have tended
to limit the variance of the final results and thus reduced the likelihood of
I-I
generatingextremevalues on the "tails"of the accident cost distribution.
In the Phase II model this computationhas been made stochastic,and several
other subroutinesin the completemodel have similarlybeen made to operate in
a random rather than an expectedvalue mode.
The calculationis essentially"inputdriven";that is, the results
dependon a hostof inputdata,many of whichare fromsourcesnot directly
linkedto the problemat hand (forexample,nationaleconomicdata). Otherinput
dataelements,suchas the amountof carbonfibercompositeon an airplane,and
the fractionof carbonthatwouldbe releasedif thatairplanewere to crash
and burn,are documentedfor the PhaseI calculation.For PhaseII additional
experimentaldatawereavailable,and wereused. Thus the resultspresented
in thisreportare basedon theuse of a computermodelthatis more sophis-
ticatedthanthe one used in PhaseI, operatingon a muchmore soliddata base.
In additionORI was requestedto investigatethe potentialriskto the electric
utilitysubdistributionsystem.
The basictechnicalapproachto the riskassessmentproblemis to
simulatemanyaircraftaccidentswith fire,eachone characterizedby many
randomvariables,and thencompilestatisticsbasedon the analysisof the
computedimpactof the seriesof accidents.The availabilityof high-speed
digitalcomputingtechniquesmakesthisapproachfeasible. This is an applica-
tionof the so-calledMonteCarlosimulationtechnique.The principalelements
in the scenariothat is simulatedare:
• Aircraft accident with fire
o Release of carbon fiber material
e Entrainment of the carbon fibers in a smoke plume
m Transport of the carbon fiber material downwind
• Transfer of some of the fibers into the interior of buildings
• Failures of electrical and electronic equipment
• Economic impact of these failures
In addition to the simulation of these events per se the complete model must
perform many other functions related to the selection of appropriate random
I-2
variables, as well as what may be termed "housekeeping" functions. A simpli-
fied form of the complete airport risk assessment model is illustrated in the
flowchart appearing in Figures l.la and l.lb.
The simulation of one accident requires the random selection of the
accident location. This selection depends on input data that is the result of
a detailed analysis of all historical jet aircraft accidents in which fires
were involved, performed under NASAsponsorship by the principal airframe
manufacturers. The estimate of the amount of fibermaterial released depends
on inputs that define the mix of aircraft in the fleet for the target year of
1993. The fraction of the material that is released as fibers in the size
range of interest is based on recent experimental results. The computer pro-
gram models the behavior of the resulting fire plume that carries the released
fibers aloft. The downwind transport and diffusion processes are then modelled
using methods that are somewhat more general and refined compared to those
used in Phase I. The necessary meteorological inputs for this calculation
are drawn at random from a body of data for each of the airports for which
the calculations are made.
The transport and diffusion calculation provides the exposure or
dosage at predefined points. These points are selected in advance to be repre-
sentative of the area at risk surrounding the airport. In all cases these
extend to a range of at least 50 miles from the airport at which the simulated
accidents occur. The points are selected to represent concentrations of
businesses, industry, and private residences in individual counties, in order
to make use of readily available county-based economic and other census data.
All types of vulnerable businesses and industry, as well as households, are
characterized by particular types of buildings at the representative points.
The definition of the building types includes a set of ventilation parameters,
obtained from standard engineering sources modified by particular experimental
data appropriate to the carbon fibers. These parameters are used in the cal-
" culating the fraction of the fibers outside each building that would get in-
side, termed the transfer function. In this way the risk assessment model
determines the exposure or dosage to which vulnerable equipment is subjected.
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With the interior exposure available we can then compute the pro-
ability of failure for specific classes of vulnerable equipment, previously
defined for each type of business, industry, and household in the airport
environs. The failures of individual equipments are then determined using
randomized or Monte Carlo methods. The impact of these failures is then
assessed in several ways. First all equipment failures are totalled to esti-
mate the required cost to repair the damaged equipment. The likelihood that
the equipment failure would be severe enough to cause a place of business to
close is then examined. This is based on the assumption that the business
facility would close if electric power were lost, if its principal control
systems were knocked out, or if half of its production equipment fails. These
events are also determined on a random basis for essentially each place of
business in the downwind path of the plume resulting from the and accident
and fire. The financial impact of such closings is estimated by allocating
to each place of business its estimated share of the Gross Domestic Product
for that class of business or industry. If a place of business is determined
to have closed as a result of the carbon fiber release incident, a clean up
cost is also assessed. The household equipment impact, because of the large
number of essentially identical equipments at risk in very similar environ-
ments is treated on an expected-value basis.
The vulnerability of avionics equipment aboard aircraft parked at
the airport is also examined in the risk assessment calculation. The number
of aircraft in a potentially vulnerable state at the airport is determined
from data provided by the aircraft manufacturers via NASA. For each air-
craft the calculation determines the number of each class of equipment in
each of several at-risk states. The number of failures is then determined on
a random basis, and the input repair costs are used to determine the total
impact of such failures.
After all business facilities and households at risk, and all parked
aircraft have been examined, the model has generated an estimate of the total
impact of one accident, in 1976 dollars. These results are available for the
three principal impact categories: business/industry, household, and avionics
equipment in parked aircraft. The computer program management module then
returns to the "front end" to generate the details associated with the next
accident in the sample year being replicated, if there are any more. Once all
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accidents in a sample year have been simulated the model generates another
sample year, with its aircraft accidents, simulates the details of each acci-
dent, then does the next sample. This process continues until the.preset
number of annual replications has been completed. At this point we have the
impact for many sample years and compute the statistics over all samples.
These include such measures as the mean annual impact, and the mean impact
per accident, as well as the risk profiles. The risk profile shows graphically
the probability that the annual impact will exceed any value.
The method described briefly above has been applied to a sample of
nine airports. These were selected as reasonably representative of U.S. air-
ports in Phase I, although they were purposely chosen to be a conservative
group, in the sense of representing the "high side" of the risk. In order to
compute the total risk at the national level, this set of airports was assumed
to represent the entire United States. The national risk model generates ran-
dom accidents during a sample year and determines, on a random basis, which
of the nine airports that each accident would have taken place. A pre-
viously simulated accident at that airport is selected at random, and its com-
puted impact added to the running total for the current replication's national
impact. By repeating this process many times the national model generates the
statistics necessary to produce the national risk profile.
The methods outlined here are described in detail in the remainder
of this report. The accident details, including extrapolation of the 1993 com-
mercial aircraft fleet mix, and other necessary inputs are described in Section
II which follows immediately. The fire plume calculation is described in
detail in Section III.
The improved Phase II methods for computing the downwind transport
and diffusion of the material contained in the plume are described in Section
IV. The methods used to compute the transfer of the diffused material into
the interior of buildings and other structures, including the use of new Phase
II data, appears in Section V. The following part of the report, Section VI,
discusses the methods of treating equipment failures. At this point in the
logic flow of the simulation we are ready to calculate failures and need to
convert those failures into dollar measures of impact. The required methods
are described in detail in Section VII; this part of the methodology comprises
1-7
the major Phase II improvement over Phase I. The required data bases for the
economic inputs are also detailed in that section. Results of the single air-
port simulations are presented in Section VIII, including several sensitivity
tests, which examine the impact on the risk results of significant changes in
input data and associated assumptions. The national model and the results it
generated are presented in Section IX. The ORI conclusions appear in Section
X. The analysis of failures in the electrical power distribution system is
described in Appendix A.
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II. ACCIDENT/RELEASE
In this section of the report we describe the method used to "gen-
erate" an accident and determine the amount of fiber released in the accident.
The model is applied to a single airport at a time. The generation of an acci-
dent with fire involving an aircraft with CF composite in its structure is the
first step in the scenario simulated by the ORI risk assessment model.
1993 FLEET COMPOSITION
In order to estimate the amount of carbon fiber that might be re-
leased in an accident with fire it was first necessary to estimate the amount
of carbon fiber that would be on particular aircraft, as well as the mix of
aircraft in the 1993 fleet. The principal aircraft manufacturers, working with
NASA, and in consultation with ORI, prepared descriptions of the different air-
craft configurations to be introduced from now until 1993. These are defined by
the amount of composite material in all structural components; each of the air-
craft types is defined in Table 2.1. Several aircraft, defined early in Phase II,
were later dropped when it was determined that it was unlikely that they would
be in the 1993 fleet. For this reason no aircraft of types 3 and 4 appear in
Table 2.1. Several different aircraft defined by the airframe manufacturers
thatwere essentially identical from the composite distribution viewpoint were
combined in preparing the table. Retirement schedules were developed, and
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TABLE 2.1
DEFINITION OF TYPESOF AIRCRAFT EXPECTEDTO BE IN THE 1993
COMMERCIAL FLEETBY SIZE AND AMOUNT OF COMPOSITE (KILOGRAMS)
Aircraft Size and Identification Number
Small Medium Large
Component 1 2 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1. Rudderand Tab 0 0 73 73 73 250 0 0 0 50 50 341 98 98 98 98 98
2. VerticalStab. 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 17 17 17 0 212 212 212 212
3. Elev.and Tab 0 0 107 107 107 170 0 0 0 0 0 237 199 116 116 116 116
4. Hor. Stab. 0 0 0 0 0 129 0 0 0 180 180 180 593 741 741 741 741
5. Wing FlapT.E. 0 0 0 0 462 156 0 0 0 219 219 219 0 593 593 593 593
ro 6. Spoiler 54 54 68 68 68 98 0 0 0 137 137 137 0 0 0 0 0I
7. Ailerons 0 0 24 24 24 171 0 0 103 0 0 239 103 103 103 103 103
8. Wing T.E. Sup. 0 0 0 0 461 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 410 410 410
9. L.E. Flap 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10. Wing L.E. Sup. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 553 553 553
11. Wing Box 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10206
12. Nacelle 0 0 45 45 45 1852 0 131 131 0 3107 3107 132 307 611 1391 1391
13. FanBlade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14. Wing Fairing 11 11 16 16 16 361 0 0 0 506 506 506 0 0 328 328 328
15. Wheel Doors 0 0 34 34 34 29 0 0 0 0 0 179 157 157 157 157 157
16. Fuselage 0 127 0 215 215 0 155 155 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17. FloorBeams 0 0 0 0 0 558 0 0 0 909 909 909 0 711 711 711 711
18. CockpitWindow Sup. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Composite 65 192 367 582 1505 3786 156 286 1234 2018 5125 5071 1282 3038 4633 5413 15,619
Note:Types3 and4 definedearlyin PhaseII were laterdropped.Types20, 21, 22 not shown in tableare aircraftwith no CF.
t _ B • d
introduction of new aircraft "played" for each year. This straightforward cal-
culation led to the development of an estimate of the 1993 fleet mix. The re-
sult is shown in Table 2.2.
ACCIDENTRATE
In Phase I, ORI conducted a limited analysis of individual aircraft
accident reports and summary data available through the National Transportation
Safety Board. In Phase II, under NASAauspices, the major aircraft manufac-
turers completed detailed analyses of approximately I00 jet aircraft accidents
in which fire played a part. These analyses provided estimates of the damage
to each major aircraft structural component. Based on this data base, it was
determined that the annual fire-accident rate pertinent to the risk assessment
was 3.8 per year; this has been accepted as the best estimate available for
the 1993 scenario. For the risk assessment calculation we are only concerned.
with aircraft containing composite material, estimated to be about 70 percent
(cf. Tables 2.1, 2.2) of the 1993 fleet, for a resulting national mean number
of carbon-fiber aircraft accidents with fire of 2.6 per year.
The simulation model treats one aircraft size at a time. Accordingly,
for airport A an_ aircraft of slze S, we estimate the annual accident-with-
fire rate by:
_(A,S) = NA,S x 2.6
_ NA,sAS
where NA,S is the number of operations of aircraft of size S at airport A; thus
the sum
_ NA,SAS
comprises all operations in the U.S. In any one replication (a random year)
the number of accidents is assumed to fit a Poisson distribution. The
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TABLE2.2
1993 COMMERCIALAIRCRAFTFLEET PROJECTION °
Composite per
Aircraft ORI Identification Number in aircraft
Size Number Fleet (kilograms)
1 71 65
Small 2 80 192
20 409 0
5 125 367
6 37 582
Medium 7 255 1,505
8 329 3,786
21 34 0
9 7 155
I0 5 286
II 326 1,234
12 54 2,018
13 80 5,125
Large 14 192 6,071
15 53 1,282
16 53 3,038
17 143 4,633
18 79 5,413
19 II 15,619
22 396 0
s
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probability of exactly n accidents with fire involving aircraft of size S at
I).
airport A is given by
- _ (A,S) _n(a,s)P(n; _(A,S)) = e
n!
The Monte Carlo simulation model makes a random draw from this distribution
during each replication for one airport, and one size aircraft. Because the
number of accidents in any one replication is very small the computer model
actually uses a double precision sampling technique.
AMOUNTOF CARBONFIBER RELEASED
The airframer accident analysis generated estimates of the amount
of each major aircraft component that was involved in each accident. These
output results were combined with the characterization of each aircraft--amount
of composite ineach component--to provide an estimate of the amount of com-
posite that would have been involved in each of the historical fire accidents.
For each projected 1993 aircraft type identified in Table 2.1 the ORI risk
assessment team computed the sum:
Composite Consumed= _] (Fraction Consumed) x (Amount of Composite)
c C C
for all accidents in the airframers' analysis, where the index c refers to an
aircraft component. Thus, for one aircraft type, defined by a distribution
of composite material, we estimated the total amount of composite material that
would have been consumed in each of the analyzed historical accidents. The
results, a sample of which are shown in Table 2.3, comprise one of the major in-
put data sets for the risk calculation. In each simulated accident involving
an aircraft in a particular size category, the specific aircraft type is deter-
mined in a random draw. The probability that the aircraft is of type k is
determined by the ratio of the number of aircraft of type k in the fleet to the
total number of aircraft in the size category. The simulation model then de-
termines the amount of composite material involved in the fire by randomly
• selecting, on an equally likely basis, one of the accidents, i.e., an amount
of composite from the appropriate column of the complete form of Table 2.3.
I) W. Feller, 1950. An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications,
Vol I, John Wiley, New York. Page 158 et seq.
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Table 2-3
A_IOUNTOF COMPOSITEINVOLVED IN FIRE (KILOGRAMS}FOR
1993 CO)UIERCIALAIRCRAFT IN SELECTED ACCIDENTS
Accident Op Aircraft Type
No. Phase Severity I 2 5 6 7 8 9 iO 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
I TakeoFf Severe 49 164 209 403 1141 1699 139 152 985 1763 2074 2682 687 1993 3122 3200 13406
4 Takeoff Moderate 2 2 10 10 195 141 0 0 0 189 189 224 31 269 334 334 334
2c Landing Moderate 14 52 36 101 2_5 423 46 59 313 317 628 699 '76 212 655 733 733
23 Landing Severe 49 160 135 32? 958 2170 135 200 997 1686 3239 3561 285 1558 2561 2951 8054
i
I
To actuallydeterminethe amountof carbonfiberreleased,it is
assumedthatone percentof the carbonfiberinvolvedis actuallyreleasedas
3-mm singlefibers. Analysisof the accidentdata indicatedthatapproximately
1 out of 30 accidentsduringlandingsand takeoffsinvolvedexplosions.The
modeluses thisvalueas the appropriateprobabilityto randomlydetermine
whetheran explosionoccurredin the simulatedaccident, If an explosiondid
occur,an additionaltwo-and-a-halfpercentof the carbonfiberis released
due to the agitationof the compositematerial.This inputis basedon experi-
mentalevidenceobtainedaftercompletionof PhaseI, and is in markedcontrast
to the inputused then. In PhaseI the fractionof carbonfiberreleasedas
singlefiberswas assumedto be 0.20.
Each accidentin the historicalfile is alsocharacterizedby the
operationalphaseduringwhichthe accidentoccurredand the degreeof severity.
The accidentswere analyzedto obtaina distributionof locationsfor landing
and takeoffaccidents.The generalizedistributionwas appliedto eachof
the airportsfor whichthe riskcalculationsweremade. In each simulated
accidentthe locationdistributionis sampledto drawan actuallocationto be
used in the calculation.The severitymeasureassociatedwitheach accident
is used laterin determiningthe plumeheight. It shouldbe notedthatthe
methodsdescribedhererepresenta greatincreasein the amountof variance
permittedin the calculationover thoseemployedin the PhaseI riskassess-
ment.
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III. PLUMEHEIGHTCALCULATION
The simulated release of graphite fibers starts with the aircraft
accident and resulting fire. In the preceding section we described the
methods used to estimate the fraction of the aircraft consumed in the fire
and the calculation of the amount of fiber released. The next step in the
simulation is described in this section.
As a result of the fire a hot buoyant plume is formed that rises to
a "stabilization" height which is a function of the energy available, the wind
speed, and the atmospheric stability. The graphite fibers enter the buoyant
plume and are lifted to the stabilization height.
GENERALMETHOD
As in Phase I, calculation of the plume rise (or elevation), H, at
stabilization from an open fire follows the work of Briggs I)," since no improved
approach has been located in Phase II. In the Briggs model, as adapted, the
height of the plume, in meters, is Given by:
H = 2.9 (F/us) I/3
I__/G.A. Briggs: "Some Recent Analyses of Plume Rise Observations." Paper
presented at the 1970 International Air Pollution Conference of the Inter-
national Union of Air Pollution Prevention Associations.
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for stable conditions, and
H = 1.6Fl/3u-lx 2/3 when x <3.5x* (3.1 b)
H - 1.6FI/3u-I(3.5X*)2/3, when x <3.5x* (3.1 c)
for neutral or unstable conditions, where u is the mean wind speed in meters
per second and:
x* = 14F5/8, when F<55 (3.2 a)
x* = 34F2/5, when F>55 (3.2 b)
The buoyancy flux parameter, F, appearing in the above equation, is given by
F = gQR
where:
G = acceleration of gravity, 9.8 m/sec 2
QR= heat emission rate, kcal/sec
Cp = specific heat of air at constant pressure,
.2391 kcal/kg°K.
p = atmospheric density, 1.239 k_/_ 3
T = ambient temperature, OK.
The atmospheric stability parameter, s, is defined by:
: gaO
s T--£
where:
@O_ gradient of potential temperature, O.35°/km
@z for stable conditions.
HEATEMISSIONRATE
In order to use the Briggs formulas, it is necessary to specify QR'
the heat emission rate for a burning aircraft; this is, in turn, the product
of the rate measured in gallons per unit time, and the fuel heat content per
gallon. In Phase I a standard burn rate was used, based on the experimental
data available at that time. In Phase II we were able to turn to the detailed
fire-accident analysis previously referred to. In this case, it was possible
to estimate the fuel burn rate for accidents occuring during different opera-
tional phases, as well as accidents of different severity. The reported
accidents involved small jet aircraft almost exclusively, so a scaling factor
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proportional to the relative volume of the aircraft fuel tanks, as reported
in Janes '2-/ was used to estimate the burn rates for other size aircraft. The
results are summarized in Table 3.1.
Another major input, or modelling assumption, concerns the behavior
of the plume at an inversion. In the ORI Phase I Final Report this matter
was discussed at some length. On the basis of the evidence available then,
and not significantly increased during Phase II, we continued to model the
plume so that it does not penetrate the inversion. In subsequent sections of
this report we examine the impact of this assumption on the final results.
With the inputs described here, and the above decision regarding
behavior of the plume at an inversion, the computer model implementing Equa-
tions (3.1) and (3.2), can determine the stabilization height for the plume
resulting from the simulated accident involving any of theprojected 1993
aircraft for any combination of wind speed and stability conditions.
2-/ Janes' All The Worlds Aircraft-1977-78, J. Taylor.
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TABLE 3.1
ESTIMATEDFUELBURNRATES(Liters/Minute)
Aircraft Size
Operational Phase DamageSeverity Small Medium Large
Takeoff Minor 238 397 794
Substantial 1590 2650 5300
Landing Minor 719 1192 2385 "
Substantial 1590 2650 5300
Static - 19 19 19
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IV. DOWNWINDTRANSPORTANDDIFFUSIONOFFIBERS
After a simulated accident, fire, and release of carbon fibers, a
buoyant plume carries the fibers aloft, as described in the preceding section
of this report. The plume at its stabilization height may be considered a
point source; meteorological transport and diffusion methods are then applied
to determine the downwind dosage (or exposure) at points of interest.
BASIC CONCEPTS
In Phase I, ORI adapted an essentially standard EPA Gaussian plume
transport and diffusion model to the needs of the risk assessment study. The
model provides for downwind transport and diffusion of material in the form
of a plume that diffuses simultaneously in the crosswind and vertical directions.
The emitting source can be elevated at any specified height. The atmosphere
is characterized as being in one of several stability classes. Dispersion para-
meters that govern the rate of crosswind and downwind diffusion are associated
with each stability class. The plume rise calculations, described previously,
give the source height which is used explicitly in the transport and diffusion
model.
o In Phase II further extensions were made to the ORI transport and
diffusion model. These allow for multiple reflections of the diffusing
particles and provide an improved mechanism for accounting for particle fallout
at downwind distances that are so large that the cloud is uniformly dispersed
in the vertical.
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The wind speed at plume height is treated as representative of the
layer in which the carbon fibers are dispersing. The standard power law for
the variation of wind speed with height may be written:
U : uo (N/7) p (4.1) =
where H is the height in meters. In the cases presented in this report, then,
H is typically assigned a value equal to the stabilization height of the plume
resulting from the fire following the aircraft accident. The exponent "p" is
assigned specific values for different atmospheric stability conditions, as
shown in Table 4.1.
In most cases rather stringent physical conditions must be met for
the plume to "punch through" an inversion. Observations indicate that this
typically does not occur. It was therefore considered reasonable to assume that
if the computed plume height is greater than the height of the inversion, it
can be set equal to the inversion height. The impact of relaxing this
condition and permitting the plume to penetrate the inversion is examined
in Section Vll below.
ORI TRANSPORTAND DIFFUSION EQUATIONS
General Case
The Phase I meteorological transport and diffusion equations were
modified to include the direct component and five reflected components at down-
wind locations. The method of treating the multiple reflections follows that
presented by Cramer, et al. I--/ generalized for additional reflections in
accordance with the concepts presented by the Environmental Protection Agency_
The general result for the dosage (exposure) at a point on the surface at a
location (x,y) in units of particle-seconds per cubic meter is:
E (x,y,O,H') = Q exp [- ½(y )j expl- ( )] .
_Oy uzU a oz .Y
I/ H.E. Cramer, et a_J_l.1972: Development of Dosage Models and Concepts, U.S.Army Dugaway P-r-ovlng Ground, Dugway, Utah. AD893 341 L.
2_/ User's Manual for Single-Source (CRSTER)Model EPA July 1977, EPA-450/2-77-013. ' '
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TABLE4.1
WINDPROFILEEXPONENT c,
Pasquil l-Gifford
Stability Class Exponent, p
A - Most Unstable 0.I0
B 0.15
C 0.20
D - Neutral 0.25
E 0.30
F - Most Stable 0.30
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(_ o (4.2)
Z Z
1 H' +4Hm) 2 H' "+ r2 exp[-_ - ( ] + rexp [-½ (- + 4 Hm)2]
o o
z z
+ r 2 exp [-,2-- (-H' + 6
0
Z
where :
x : downwind distance from source to receptor,
y = crosswind distance from source to receptor,
u = mean wind speed, m/sec,
Q = number of particles released
Oy = standard deviation of the wind speed in the crosswind direction,
as a function of x and the stability class
Oz = standard deviation of the wind speed in the vertical, as a func-
tion of x and the stability class
r = reflection coefficient, the fraction of particles that are
reflected from the ground surface. The corresponding coefficient
for reflections from the base of the inversion is assumed to be
unity.
In order to incorporate the effect of particle fallout into our cal-
culations we adopted the tilted-plume method presented by Van der Hoven,_/ and
also used by Cramer_/, Equation (4.2) makes use of the effective plume height,
H', given by:
H' = H - (Vs/U) x, (4.3)
where vs is the particle fall rate. This is essentially the method previously
used in Phase I to account for particl6s falling out of the cloud.
3_/
Meteorology and Atomic Energy 1968, David H. Slade, Editor, AEC, July
1968.
4_/
Cramer, et al.oID, cit.
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Modification for Large Distance Downwind
When the vertical range over which the plume is mixed becomes equal
to the depth of the mixed layer (below the inversion), we can assume that a
relatively uniform distribution of particles in the vertical exists. The
model therefore makes the distribution of graphite fibers uniform in the ver-
tical, from the ground surface to the base of the inversion, when OzbeComes
larger than 1.6 Hm, and where Hm is the height of the base of the inversion.
At distances far enough downwind (oz >1.6 Hm) that mixing results
in an essentially uniform distribution of the fibers in the vertical, we there-
fore use :
E(x,y,O,H') = q [exp - 1 _] [ Vs x (l-r)] (4 4)2"5066°y Hmu • _ ( exp UHm •
The general form of this expression follows Turner -5/, except for the final
term, which accounts for the fallout of the particles due to gravitational
settling. This result may be derived by considering the change in the number
of particles in a uniformly distributed layer during a small time interval of
length dt:
dN = -(N/H m) Vs(l-r)dt
where N is the number of particles, and the other variables have been defined
previously. Upon integration we obtain
N = N(O)exp[-(Vs/H m) (l-r)t] (4.5)
where N(O) is the number of particles present at time t:O. Since t may be
estimated by the ratio x/u, we obtain the final term appearing in Equation
(4.4).
INPUTSTO TRANSPORTCALCULATIONS
Actual mixing height values were developed, as in Phase I, from
climatological mean values reported by Holzworth_ modified for different
_JD. Bruce Turner, Workbook of Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates, EPA, 1970.
Publication N6. AP-26.
6-_olzworth, Mixin 9 Heights, Wind Speeds, and Potential for Urban Air Pollution
Throughout the Contiguous United States, EPA, January 1972.
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stabilityconditionsas suggestedby Calder7__/.Sensitivityteststo determine
the impactof changesin mixingheightvaluesare presentedlaterin this
report.
In many diffusionproblemsit is customaryto determinethe location
of an upwindvirtualpointsourcefromwhicha diffusingplumewouldhavegrown
to the sizecomputedat plumestabilization.In view of the largeuncertainties
in otherphasesof the riskcalculation,and our concernwith effectssome
milesdownwindfrom the accidentsite,we haveset the virtualpointsource
directlyover theaccident- firesite.
The reflectioncoefficienthasbeen set equalto l at the inversion
and to 0.7 at the ground. Thesevalueswere developedin consultationwith
Messrs.Cramerand Trethewayat a meetingconvenedby the NASAGraphiteFiber
RiskAssessmentProgramOffice. The generalassociationbetweenthe 2 centi-
meter-per-secondfallrateof the fiberparticlesand the reflectioncoefficient
at the groundhas beendemonstratedby Dumbauld,Rafferty,and Cramer.
The diffusioncalculationrequiresinputvaluesof the dispersion
parameters,Oy and oz, as functionsof the downwinddistance,x, and the
prevailingstabilityconditions.The standardin this caseis providedby
thewell-knownPasquill-Giffordcurves8_/.Severalinvesigatorshavequestioned
theiruniversalapplicability;the readeris referredto Pasquill'srecentwork
on this subject 9_/. In view of the fact that no generally accepted modifica-
tion of the Pasquill-Giffordcurvesexists,we adoptedthesecurvesfor the
PhaseI calculationsand continuedto use themin PhaseII. For presentpur-
posestherewere most convenientlyused in the formof a computerprogram
madeavailableby EPA.
The basicweatherinputsrequired,surfacewind speedand direction,
and stabilityclass,are drawnfromhistoricaldata. Thesedatawere obtained
7-/K.L. Calder,"A ClimatologicalModelfor MultipleSourceUrbanAir Pollu-
tion,"AppendixD to A. D. Buseand J. R. Zimmerman,User'sGuidefor the
ClimatologicalDispersionModel,EPA-71-024,December1973.
8_!SeeTurner,op cit,for example.
9_!F.Pasquill,AtmosphericDispersionParametersin GaussianPlumeModeling,
Part II, "PossibleRequirementsfor Changein the TurnerWorkbookValues,"
EPA-600/4-76-0306.
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from the National Weather Records Center for the airports we studied; the data
provide the frequency for each combination of the three weather parameters.
The simulation model makes a random draw of one of these combinations weighted
by the input frequency.
TRANSPORTAND DIFFUSIONMODELSENSITIVITY TESTS
ORI, Inc. was required by the Phase II contract to test the model
results' sensitivity to different particle sizes. For this purpose the trans-
port and diffusion calculations were performed independently of the complete
risk assessment model. Figures 4.1 to 4.4 compare the downwind "foot-prints"
for 200 kilograms of carbon released as single fibers and as brush-clumps in
different meteorological conditions. The input conditions for these results
are summarized in Table 4.2.
In order to normalize the comparison, the amount of carbon release in
the two forms is kept constant in the different calculations. The combina-
tion of the reduced number of particles - 108 clumps versus 1012 singles -- and
the higher fall rate of the clumps results in a greatly reduced footprint for
the clumps. The maximumexposures for the clump calculations are lower than
for the singles by at least two orders of magnitude. The dominant factor in
these comparisons is the difference in the number of particles per kilogram.
GEOGRAPHICALINPUTS
The methods described to this point permit the computer model to gene-
rate an accident, determine a release amount of CF, the height to which the
carbon fibers are lofted, and the downwind transport end diffusion of these
fibers. All of these events are randomized using appropriate Monte Carlo
methods. The transport and diffusion calculation provides the dosage or
exposure at particular points defined by their by x, y coordinates. It is
appropriate to define these points here, although much of the underlying
motivation comes from the methods used in the cost calculations, described
later. Briefly, it is pointed out here that much of the required economic
data is county based. For this reason the focus of our interest is on
counties surrounding the airport at or near which simulated accidents may
occur.
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TABLE 4.2
SUMMARYOF INPUT CONDITIONS
AND RESULTSOBTAINED
IN TEST OF TRANSPORT/DIFFUSION
MODELFORDIFFERENTFIBER
PARTICLESIZES
(Release = 200 kilograms)
Meteorology Output Particle Size
Single Clump
Fall Rate Fall Rate
No. (M/sec) No. (M/sec)
1012 .02 108 1.0
Stability Class 6 Fig. No. 4.1 4.2
Plume Height I00 m Max Exp_ 2xlO6 2xlO4
Mean Wind 5-5 (FSec/mJ)
m/sec
Stability Class l Fig. No. 4.3 4.4 .
Plume Height 1900m
Mean wind 3.5 Max Exp:
M/sec (FSec/m3) 1.6xlO 5 20
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rAs in Phase I, then, county-based economic data were adopted for
computer input; in many cases counties were divided into smaller, homogeneous
geographical units. In each case the center of the county or sub-county geo-
graphical unit was selected and a representative circle inscribed within that
area. The input data set includes the coordinates of the center and the
associated radius. The exposure and resulting impact calculations are made
at the center and points a distance equal to two-thirds of the radius to the
east, west, north, and south of the center.
Figure 4.5 shows this geometrical pattern schematically. This
method was adopted to provide area-sensitivity in the resulting impact cal-
culation. The use of the two-thirds radius mesh interval was selected so that
representative points selected in neighboring circles could not be colocated.
The resulting mesh, if all circles were equal in size, would be square with
all points equidistant from one another.
In each case the county-based business/industry sites are uniformly
- distributed over these five points. The concept is illustrated in Figure 4.6,
as it was applied to one county for the Washington National Airport risk cal-
culations. In all cases this methodwas applied to the area around each air-
port to a distance of 50 miles or more.
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FIGURE4.5. SCHEMATICMETHODOFMODELLINGAN INDIVIDUALCOUNTY,SHOWINGREPRESENTATIVE
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FIGURE 4.6. Definition of Areas at Risk for Washington National
Airport. Howard County, Maryland, Outlined in Upper
Map, Shown in Detail in Lower Map. Circles Represent Con-
centrations of Business, Industry, and Residences. Method
was Applied to all Counties Within 50 Miles of Airport.
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V. TRANSFEROFFIBERSINTO INTERIOROFSTRUCTURES
In computing the impact on electrical and electronic equipment of
exposure to carbon fibers we are principally concerned with equipment inside
buildings. It is therefore necessary to compute the exposure inside a building
resulting from a known value of the exposure outside. This section of the
report describes the methods developed by ORI to accomplish this. In the
logic flow of the risk assessment simulation model the transfer calculation
follows the computation of exterior exposure values.
METHOD
When a building is impinged on by a plume of carbon fibers, some
of the fibers may enter the building through air conditioning or other ventila-
tion systems and by various leakage paths. Once inside the building or
enclosure, fibers will be removed by fallout and through leakage paths back
to the outside. If inside air is recirculated and filtered, additional
fibers will be removed. The concentration of fibers that produce failure
stresses on equipments in a building or enclosure at any time may be deter-
mined from equations describing the net flow. These have been developed in
a relatively simple form by Slade. I)
I__/David H. Slade, Editor, Meteorology and Atomic Energy, AEC, July 1968.
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In Phase I, ORI was able to show that the "transfer function" or
ratio of interior to exterior exposure can be expressed as:
E _ vi (5.1)
Eo Vo+aVs+Vr
where:
v i = rate at which fiber-borne air enters the building, or enclosure
through the air conditioning system and all leakage paths
vo = rate at which fiber-borne air leaves the building, including
that removed by recirculation
vs = fall rate of carbon fibers
vr = rate at which fibers are removed by recirculation filtering
s : volume of building or enclosure
a = area of space subject to fallout.
IMPLEMENTATION
As in the earlier Phase I effort, Equation (5.1) provided the basis
for calculating interior exposure values. In Phase I, ORI, Inc. defined
several types of buildings and other enclosures; each was characterized by
size, types of doors and windows and ventilating equipment. These basic
enclosure types were used with some minor revisions in Phase II. It was no
longer necessary to treat equipment enclosures explicitly since all equip-
ment failure tests (see Section VI below) included the effect of typical
enclosures. The following principal building/enclosure categories were
defined in Phase II:
I. Small Equipment Building or Van
2. Medium Equipment Building
3. Large Equipment Building or Factory
4. Equipment Room in Building
5. Utility Room
a) filtered
b) unfiltered
6. Residence
a) air conditioned
b) not air conditioned
7. Retail/Wholesale Establishments.
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Generalizedesignfactorsare associatedwith eachof thesebuilding/enclo-
suretypesin Table5.1.
Itwas shownin PhaseI, that,as longas basicarchitecturalrela-
tionshipsaremaintained,the ventilationmode of a buildingis essentially
independentof the actualsizeof thebuilding. Thesedesignfactorsare
used to determinethe air conditioningflowrates,filterefficiencies,and
air leakageratesusedin Equation(5.1). Ventilationrateswere basedon
publishedindustrystandards2'3/. The valuesof filterefficiencyused in
PhaseI were changedto incorporatenew experimentalresults. It was also
shownin PhaseI that,althoughventilationratesare a functionof wind
speed,the "falloutterm"in Equation(5.1)tendsto be dominant.Accordingly,
transferfunctionswere computedfor a nominallOmeter-per-secondwind
speed. The resultingtransferfunctions,shownin Table5.2,were used in
all PhaseII calculations.Specificbuildingtypeswere associatedwith
differentcategoriesof businessand industry,as describedin SectionVI,
below.
2_/CarrierAir ConditioningC., Handbookof Air Conditionin9 SystemDesign,
McGraw-HillBookCo., 1965
3_/Baumeister& Marks,StandardHandbookforMechanicalEngineers,McGraw-
HillBookCo., 1967.
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TABLE 5.1
]ESIGN FACTORSFORORI STANDARDENCLOSURES
Venti la-
Size Doors Facing !.!ind Windows Facing Wind tionEnclosure W x L x It •
Category (feet) No. Size i Type No. Size type Rate(CFFI)
I. Small Equipment 15 x 30 x 15 I 3' x 7' Industrial/ 0 300
Building or Van Weatnerstrip
Industrial
2. Medium Equipment 30 x 60 x I0 2 3' x 7' Industrial/ 2 3' x S' Case_.ent 1000
Bu|Iding Weatherstrip l/64" Crack
3. Large Equipment I00 x 300 x 10' 3 3' x 7' Industrial/ 20 3' x 5' Industrial 3000Case_.ent
Building or Factory W{atharstrip 1/64" Crack
Building (per floor)
3' x 7'
l 3' 5'4=- 4. Equipment Room in 30 x 60 x 10 2 Interior/ Factory Type 5 x Industrial 1000
Bullding (one exter- Exterior Interior and Casemenz
ior wall) Vestibule Exterior 1/64" Crack
Factory Type
5. Utility Room 30 x 60 x I0 l 3' x 7' Exterior/ 0 .... 50_
I/8" Crack
Glass - Avg.'...... _sid}_--r,-,tial' - 30"6
6. Residences 40 x 30 x B 1 3' x 7' Fit i_/16" 4 4' >-7' C.se,,_-nt b - {'one
Cr_c|. 1/32': Crack
7. Retail/Wholesale 60 x 40x I0 I 3'x 7' Swinging ;.ll!lii_dc;:sSealed I £C0
I
Establishments I
TABLE5.2 - TRANSFERFUNCTIONSFORSTANDARDENCLOSURES
i l
Enclosure Transfer
Category Function
m
1. SmallEquipmentBuildinqor Van .012
2. MediumEquipmentBuilding .010
3. LargeEquipmentBuildingor Factory .004
Building(perfloor)
4. EquipmentRoom in Building(oneexteriorwall) .010
Filtered .023
5. UtilityRoom
Non-Filtered .094
Air Conditioned .058
6. Residence
Not airConditioned .004
7. Retail/WholesaleEstablishment .004
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Vl. EQUIPMENTFAILURES
FAILURE MODEL
The probability of failure of equipment which is exposed to car-
bon fibers is obtained from the exponential expression:
PF = 1 - exp (-E/E) (6.1)
where:
PF = probability of equipment failure
E : exposure level in the immediate vicinity of the
vulnerable equipment, in fiber-seconds per cubic
meter
= average exposure causing a failure.
During Phase I, the U.S. Army Ballistics Research Laboratory (BRL) at Aber-
deen, Maryland, determined that experimental failure data for many classes of
equipment fit an exponential failure la Iv_2_ Later, it was shown that
certain failures were mutliple-fiber events. It appeared that the generalized
Weibull distribution provided a better fit to failure data for those equip-
ments. In Phase II it has been shown that, even for those equipments whose
Shelton and Moore, Have NameVulnerability of the Improved Hawk System, BRL
Report No. 1964, February 1977.
2_/
ORI discussions with BRL, August 15, 1978.
6-I
failuresdo not obey the exponentialaw,it is conservativeto use the
exponentialaw in estimatingfailures.The exponentialrelationshipgives
a highervalueof the failureprobabilityfor low valuesof the exposurethan
the Weibulldistribution,thusoverestimatingfailures,and providingthe
desiredconservatismin estimatingthe o_erallrisk. Typicalvaluesof the
exponentialfailureparameterfor genericequipmenttypesare shownbelowin
Table6.1. It shouldbe notedthatthe failureconceptsdevelopedhereapply
only to equipmentwhen it is energized.
The exposureusedin Equation(6.1)is thatdirectlyimpingingon
the vulnerable quipment.When thisequipmentis insidea building,the
interiorexposuremay be obtainedfromthe exteriorexposureby multiplying
the exteriorexposureby theappropriatetransferfunction(TF),as described
in SectionV, above. Sincethe transferfunctionand the meanexposureto
failure,E, are constantsfor a particularpieceof equipmentin a particular
building,we definea failureparameter:
Kij = (TF)j/Ei (6.2)
where:
Kij = overallfailureparameterfor equipmentof typei
in a buildingof typej
(TF)j= penetrationfactor(transferfunction)for a buildingof
type j
Ei = mean exposureto failurefor equipmentof type i.
In subsequentapplications,theparameterKij is substitutedinto Equation
(6.1)to give the probabilityof failurefor equipmentof typei in a building
of typej for any exteriorexposure:
PF,ij= 1 - exp (-KijEo) (6.3)
Thus,althoughthe exterior-to-interiort ansferprocesshas beendiscussed
as a separateentityin the precedingsection,we were ableto combinethe
failureand transfercalculationsin one proceduralstepby definingspecific
equipmentsin specifictypesof buildings.Thesemethodsare describedin more
detailbelow.
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EQUIPMENTCONFIGURATIONS
In treating typical equipment configurations it is convenient to
develop expressions for the collective probability of failure of the complete
configuration. In particular, if n identical equipments are in series so that
a failure of one causes the entire "line" to fail, the probability that the
line fails is:
..)nPF (LINE) : I- (I-PF,Ij
= l-e-nKijEo (6.4)
Similarly if n like equipments are in parallel, so that the operation fails
only if all equipments fail, the aggregate probability of failure is:
PF(Operati°n) = P_,ij (6.5)
The computer program that determines the impact of each simulated aircraft
accident and associated release of graphite fibers uses Equations (6.3)-(6.5)
to estimate the probability that each business or industry in the geographical
area of interest is affected.
One of the major efforts in Phase I was the characterization of each
business-industry sector, defined by an SlC (Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion) number, by a specific set of equipments installed in a specific type of
building. This effort was extended and made more detailed in Phase II. The
generalized business/industry equipment configuration showing the electric
power flow appears in Figure 6.1; in any one class of business or industry
portions of this configuration may not be present. Typical individual equip-
ments in each of the modules shown in Figure 6.1 are defined in Table 6.1, with
their estimated values of mean exposure to failure.
The equipment configuration was made specific to plants of different
size (small, medium, and large) in each pertinent SlC- number category. An
example will illustrate the method. A large plant in Category 28A (comprising
all 3-digit SIC code numbers under 28, basically chemical and allied products)
has an internal power interface characterized by one set of input power service
equipment, one distribution panel, and an auxiliary generator. Its common
module consists of two computers in parallel and two keyboard display units
in parallel. The plant has 25 lines in its distributed module. Each line
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POWER MODULE COMMON MODULE I DISTRIBUTED MODULE
I
I
I
Computer H Display
Primary I _
Power .._J Switch Distribution
From v I Gear Panel
Utility |
Computer Keyboard/Display
I
Auxiliary I
o_ Power II
-_ I
FIGURE6.1. GENERALIZEDBUSINESS/INDUSTRYEQUIPMENT
CONFIGURATIONAND POWERFLOW
TABLE6.1
GENERICBUSINESS/INDUSTRYEQUIPMENTSWITHMEANEXPOSURETO FAILURE
VALUES(E IN FIBERSECONDS/METER_)
Equipment Failure
Parameter
Module Code Definition (E)
Power SW Input power service equipment - trans- 108
formers, breakers, switchgear
DIST Power distribution buses and panels 108
AUX Auxiliary power supply in parallel 106
with power input
Common COMP Standard-size computer used as a cen- 107
tral facility controller
K/D Keyboard-display unit 108
Distri- PS High-voltage power supply at a machine 108
buted station
INT Interface unit used to buffer cen- 108
tral computers to line controllers
MC Manual controller, associated with each 108
electrically-operated machine
MPC Mini-computer used as a programmable 108
controller
uPC Microprocessor used as a controller 108
MM High-voltage motor controller 108
MS Machine station servo-mechanism 108
MH Heater or oven control 108
SENSOR Device to measure temperature, 107
thickness, weight, position,
motion, etc.
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consists of:
e 5 high-voltage power supply units
e 5 interface units
e 5 manual controllers
e 5 minicomputers, used as controllers
e 2 high-voltage motor controllers
e 2 machine station servo-mechanisms
e 1 heater control unit
e 5 sensor units.
Similar configurations were defined for all vulnerable categories of business
and industry. The data was developed as a result of an extensive literature
search, augmented by site visits during Phases I and II.
The data collection effort during ORl's risk assessment contract
included visits to one or more plants in each of the following major categories:
e 2011 - Meatpacking
• 2331 - WomensBlouses
e 262 - Paper Mills
e 2721 - Periodicals
• 2732 - Book Printing
• 3519 - Internal Combustion Engine Manufacturing
e 3661 - Telephone and Telegraph Equipment
• 3662 - Electronic Equipment
• 458 - Air Transportation Services
e 481 - Radio and Television Broadcasting
e 491 - Electric Services
e 806 - Hospitals
The results of these site visits, conferences with NASApersonnel, and the
earlier literature surveys are summarized in Table 6.2. Typically, a large
factory has more than 250 employees, a medium size factory 50 to 249 employees,
and a small factory 20 to 49 employees.
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TABLE 6.2
EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATIONS FOR MANUFACTURING
FACILITIES BY SIC GROUP AND SIZE
(NO. OF EQUIPMENTS)
POWER COMMON
SIC MODULE MODULE DISTRIBUTED MODULE
GROUP/
SIZE SW DIST K/D COMP K/D NO. OF LINES PS INT MC MPC /_PC K/D MM , MS MH SENSOR
20A L 1 1 1 0 0 25 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M 1 1 0 0 0 10 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20B L 1 1 1 (2) (2) 5 I 12 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 0
M 1 1 0 0 0 3 1 1 12 1 12 1 0 5 1 12
S 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
21A L 1 1 1 0 0 25 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
M 1 1 0 0 0 10 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22A L 1 1 1 (2) (2) 50 1 6 6 6 0 0 1 3 0 6
M 1 1 0 0 0 10 1 1 6 1 6 1 1 3 0 6
S 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
23A L 1 1 1 0 0 75 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
M 0 1 0 0 0 25 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
S 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24A L 1 1 1 0 0 10 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25A L 1 1 1 0 0 10 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
26A L 1 1 1 (2) (2) 3 4 8 8 8 3 0 4 3 1 4
M 1 1 0 0 0 3 2 0 6 1 5 1 3 3 0 2
28A L 1 1 1 (2) (2) 25 5 5 5 5 0 0 2 2 1 5
M 1 1 0 0 0 10 5 1 5 1 5 1 2 2 1 5
S 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
29A L 1 1 1 (2) (2) 10 5 1 8 1 8 0 8 0 0 5
30A L 1 1 1 (2) (2) 25 5 5 5 5 0 0 2 2 1 5
M 1 1 0 0 0 10 5 1 5 1 5 1 2 2 1 5
S 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
32A L 1 1 1 0 0 5 2 1 8 6 0 1 0 5 2 5
33A L 1 1 I (2) (2) 5 2 1 8 1 6 1 5 0 0 5
35A L 1 1 1 (2) (2) 50 1 1 5 1 5 1 0 5 0 2
M 1 1 0 0 0 20 1 0 5 0 5 0 0 5 0 2
S 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
35B L 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
36A L 1 1 1 (2) (2) 50 1 1 5 1 5 0 2 2 0 2
M 1 1 0 0 0 20 1 0 5 0 5 0 2 2 0 2
S 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
36B L 1 1 1 (2) (2) 50 1 1 5 1 5 0 0 3 1 2
M 1 1 0 0 0 20 1 0 5 0 5 0 0 3 1 2
S 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
36C L 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
37A L 1 1 1 (2) (2) 50 2 1 8 1 8 1 2 4 1 5
38A L 1 1 1 0 0 25 1 1 5 1 5 1 0 4 1 5
M 1 1 0 0 0 10 1 0 5 0 5 0 0 4 1 5
S 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
( ) DENOTESEQUIPMENTS IN PARALLEL
SIC GROUPS ARE DEFINEDIN NOTES FOLLOWING
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Notes to Table 6.2
ORI Code SIC Numbers Included Types of Business/Industry
20 A 201, 202, 209 Meat, Dairy, Misc. Food and Kindred Products
20 B 203, 204, 205, 206, 208 Preserved Fruits and Vegitables, Grainmill,
Bakery, Sugar, Fruits, Oils and Beverages
21A 21 X Tobacco Manufacturers
22 A 22 X Textile Mill Products
23 A 23 X Apparel and Other Textile Mill Products
24 A 24 X Lumber and Wood Products
25 A 25 X Furniture and Fixtures
26 A 26 X Papers and Allied Products
27 A 27 X Printing and Publishing
28 A 28 X Chemicals and Allied Products
29 A 29 X Petroleum and Coal Products
30 A 30 X Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products
32 A 321, 322 Glass and Glassware
33 A 331, 332, 335 Blast Furnaces and Basic Steel Products, Iron
and Steel Foundries, Non-ferrous Rolling and
Drawing
35 A 35 X Machinery, Except Electrical
36 A 361, 362, 363 Electric Equipment and Household Appliances
36 B 364, 365, 366, 367 Electric Lighting and Wiring, Radio and TV Re-
ceiving, Communication Equipment and Electronic
Components and Assessories
36C 3662 Radio and TV Communication Equipment
37 A 37 X Transportation Equipment
38 A 38 X Instruments and Related Products
The description above provides the linkage from SIC number and
size to equipment configuration, then to specific equipments and their
associated failure parameters. It was also necessary, as described above in
Section V, to relate specific building types to each vulnerable class of
business and industry. These results are summarized in Table 6.3. The
table associates the different building types defined in Table 5.1 (with
transfer functions in Table 5.2) with each of the major sections (modules)
of plants of different sizes in different SIC groups.
COMPUTERIMPLEMENTATION
The mean exposure-to-failure values for the generic equipments
defined above were summarized in Table 6.1. In using these inputs the equip-
ment-specific value of _ was combined with the building-specific transfer
function, in accordance with Equation (6.2). In order to estimate the impact
on specific business and industrial complexes it was assumed that the plant
is down if electric power is lost inside the plant, if the commonmodule
fails, or if more than one half of the ,'lines" in the distributed module fail.
The implementation of these modeling concepts is described in more detail in
the following section of the report.
Phase II results reported by other investigators indicated that the
high-voltage power supply system is essentially invulnerable; it was assumed
that an equivalent piece of equipment representing the bushings and
bus of a step-down transformer could be used to represent the possibility of
an exterior power supply failure.
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TABLE 6.3
ENCLOSURETYPES BY SIC/SIZE CATEGORY
Power Module
SIC Plant Common Distributed °
Group Size SW Dist. Aux. Module Module
20A L 5b 3 5b - 3
M 5b 3 - 3
S 2 - 2
20B L 5b 3 5b 4 3
M 5b 3 - - 3
S - 2 - - 2
21A L 5b 3 5b - 3
M 5b 3 - - 3
S - 2 - - 2
22A L 5b 3 5b 4 3
M 5b 3 - 3
S - 2 - 2
23A L 5b 3 5b - 3
M - 3 - 3
S - 2 - - 2
24A L 5b 3 5b - 3
M 5b 3 - - 3
S - 2 - - 2
25A L 5b 3 5b - 3
M 5b 3 - - 3
S - 2 - - 2
26A L 5b 3 5b 4 3
M 5b 3 - - 3
27A L 5b 3 5b 4 3
M 5b 3 - - 3
S - 2 - 2
28A L 5b 3 5b 4 3
M 5b 3 - - 3 "
S - 2 - 2
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TABLE 6.3 (CONTINUED)
Power Module
SIC Plant Common Distributed
Group Size SW Dist. Aux. Module Module
29A L 5b 3 5b 4 3
30A L 5b 3 5b 4 3
M 5b 3 - 3
S - 2 - 2
32A L 5b 3 5b - 3
33A L 5b 3 5b 4 3
34A L 5b 3 5b - 3
M 5b 3 - - 3
S - 2 - - 2
34B L 5b 3 5b - 3
M 5b 3 - - 3
S 2 - - 2
35A L 5b 3 5b 4 3
M 5b 3 - 3
S 2 - 2
35B L 5a 3 - 3
35C L 5a 3 5a - 3
36A L 5b 3 5b 4 3
M 5b 3 - 3
S 2 - - 2
36B L 5b 3 5b 4 3
M 5b 3 - - 3
S - 2 - - 2
37A L 5b 3 5b 4 3
38A L 5b 3 5b - 3
M 5b 3 - - 3
S - 2 - - 2
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VII. COSTSDUETO EQUIPMENTFAILURES
This section of the report presents ORl's Phase II methodology for
determining the costs associated with equipment failures. The most significant
changes to the Phase I methodology were introduced in this part of the risk
assessment calculation. Three categories of cost were considered for business
and industry impacts:
• Repair of damaged electrical equipment
e Facility cleanup
e Business/industry disruption.
In the Phase I risk assessment, attention was focussed on the latter cost
category using an expected value technique. In Phase II the model has been
expanded to treat all the above categories explicitly, while disruption costs
are now computed using a Monte Carlo random process. Household equipment
failures are treated as in Phase I, using an expected-value algorithm. A
completely new submodel has been developed to compute the cost incurred as
a result of failures of avionics equipment aboard commercial aircraft on the
ground.
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BUSINESS/INDUSTRYREPAIR COSTS
For each of the generic types of equipment defined previously (cf.
Table 6.1) a repair cost was estimated, using data provided by the Ballistics
Research Laboratory, information gained on the industrial site visits, and
other sources. Equipment repair cost inputs are summarized in Table 7.1.
In many cases it would be expected that repairs could be effected by the
simple act of vacuum cleaning the equipment that failed. It was assumed,
however, that a minimum repair cost would still be incurred to cover trouble-
shooting and repair time on the basis that equipment users would not usually
be aware of this fact.
As shown in the preceding section each business or industrial facil-
ity defined by SIC number and size has a'defined equipment "suit" (cf. Table
6.2). The computer model treats all the equipments of one type at one geo-
graphical location collectively. It first computes
N(i) =_ _ (Equipments of Type i) SIC S (7.1)
SIC S
to obtain the total number of equipment of type i at the location. At its
most straightforward the simulation would have been written to test each of
the N(i) equipments, and determine whether each failed using a procedure that
compares a random number with the computed failure probability PF(i). This
procedure is easy to program, but is somewhat inefficient and wastes computer
time if there are many pieces of equipment. Since each piece of equipment
either fails or not the process is an example of a Bernoulli trial. The pro-
ability that exactly k equipments fail is given by I__/:
:
Further, if N(i) is relatively large, and PF(i) is small, which is true for
the cases of interest here, and we define
!
NF(i) = N(i)PF(i), (7.3) ,
the expected number of failures of equipment of type i at the particular loca-
tion, then is _/:
b[k; N(i), PF(i)]_e--NF (i) NkF(i) . (7.4)TF.
I-/W. Feller, op. cit., p. 148 et seg.
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Table 7.1
INPUTREPAIRCOSTSFORORI STANDARDEQUIPMENTS
Equipment
CODE Definition Repair Cost ($)
POW Exterior Step-Down Transformer
300
SW Input power service equipment - trans-
formers, breakers, switchgear 3,000
DIST Power distribution buses and panels 2,600
AUX Auxiliary power supply in parallel
with power input 5,000
COMP Standard-size computer used as a central
facility controller 50,000
K/D Keyboard-display unit 3,000
PS High-voltage power supply at a machine
station 2,000
INT Interface unit used to buffer central com-
puters to line controllers 600
MC Manual controller, associated with each.
electrically-operated machine 2,500
MPC Mini-computer used as a programmable con-
troller I0,000
#PC Microprocessor used as a controller 7,000
MM High-voltage motor controller 5,600
MS Machine station servo-mechanism 1,000
MH Heater or oven control 1,000
SENSOR Device to measure temperature, thickness,
weight, position, motion, etc. 6,000
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Equation (7.4) is the Poisson distribution with mean equal to the expected num-
ber of failures. In performing the simulation the model computes the expected
number of failures for each class of equipment in turn. The number of failures
is then obtained by drawing a random sample from the appropriate Poisson dis-
tribution. This method is essentially equivalent to "playing" the failure of
each equipment individually but is much more economical. "
The procedure described above is used in several places in the cal-
culation, because of the simplification and economy it introduces into the
calculation, with only very little loss in generality. In cases where the
same class of equipment is located in facilities with different transfer func-
tions they are treated as different equipments types for computational, pur-
poses. Once the number of failures, NF(i), is obtained by sampling the Poisson
distribution, the total repair cost for that equipment type is the product of
the repair cost per equipment (Table 7.1) and NF(i). This is repeated for all
types of equipment at a given location in the downwind path of the plume. The
computer program Iogi c is illustrated in Figure 7.1, which is a schematic flow
chart for this calculation.
FACILITY CLEAN,UPCOSTS
Estimates of facility cleanup costs were made for different businesses
and industries on the basis of type of business and size of plant. Using infor-
mation gained during the Phase II site visits it was estimated that the decision
to institute a special plant-wide cleanup would be made on the basis of evidence
of major impact of the presence of carbon fibers. Accordingly, it is assumed
that an intensive plant cleanup is implemented whenever the plant is shut down
due to equipment failures, as described below. For each plant or other facility
that is shut down the model looks up the input cleanup cost for a plant of
that SIC number-size combination. The calculation of plant shut down is
described below.
DISLOCATIONCOST
It was assumed that a plant or place of business would be shut down
if power were lost, the commonmodule failed, or more than half of the produc-
tion lines failed. Figure 7.2 illustrates this concept in a decision tree
formulation. The computation is done for all plants in one SIC-code number
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Set 1st Equipment Type I
I Set Number This Equipment = 0 I_ Q
Set 1st SIC I
Set 1st Plant Size I"
Add No. This Equipment IIn This Plant To Total
This Equipment I r
Step To
Next Size
Step To >
Next SIC
Determine No. I
Of Failures
This Equipment
I Compute Total I
Repair Cost
This Equipment
FIGURE7.1 FLOWCHARTFORCOMPUTINGREPAIRCOSTSDUETO EQUIPMENTFAILURE
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group at one location. In contrast to Phase I, then, we determined plant
closings on a stochastic basis, rather than employing an expected-value
algorithm. The shutdown calculation proceeds through each SIC number and
v
each size group with that SIC number at each geographical location.
Individual Module Failures
The probability that the power module fails is determined by com-
puting the probability of failure of the primary power input, the switch gear,
the distribution panel, and auxiliary power, if present. The probability of
a power failure ahead of the distribution panel may be expressed as
RE(Power In) = {1-{I-RE(ROW)} {I-PF(SW)}} PF(AUX) (7.5)
where PF(POW), PE(SW), and PF(AUX) are the computed failure probabilities for
the primary power source, the switch gear, and the auxiliary power system,
respectively. The probability that the plant is without power is then estimated
by:
RE(Power) = RE(Power In) + {l-RE(Power In)} PF(DIST) (7.6) -
where PF(DIST) is the probability of a failure at the distribution panel.
The probability that the commonmodule fails is estimated by:
RE(Common)= 1 - {I-P_(COMP)} {I-P_(K/D)} (7.7)
where PF(COMP)and RE(K/D) are the failure probabilities for the computer and
keyboard displays respectively, and n and m are the numbers of each in parallel.
The probability that one line in the distributed module fails is given
by:
RE(Line) = 1 - {I-PF(i)} n(i) {I-RE(J)} n(j) ..... (7.8)
where PF(i) is the probability of failure for equipment of type i, and n(i)
is the number of units of type i in series in the line. Equation (7.8) indi-
cates that the line fails if at least one unit in series in the line fails; in
the equation we have indicated that there are n units of type i and m units of
type j in the line.
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Computational Method
Rather than examine each plant individually, the model examines the
group of plants in the SIC number-size group. The logic is illustrated sche-
matically in a flow chart appearing as Figure 7.3. We first determine the
expected number of power module failures by multiplying the number of plants,
N(SlC, Size), by PF(Power). The actual number of power module failures is
drawn from a Poisson distribution with this mean value. This method is entirely
analagous to that derived above for the equipment failures.
Next, this submodel treats the surviving plants, those of the orignal
N(SlC,Size) that did not suffer power module failures. The model samples a
Poisson distribution with mean equal to the product of the number of survivors
and PF(Common)to determine the number of facilities that fail due to failures
of the commonmodule.
Those plants that survive the power and commonmodule "cuts" are
then examined one by one. For each of these plants we determine, again by
sampling a Poisson distribution, the number of lines that fail. The expected
number (or mean of the distribution) is the product of the number of lines in
the distributed module and PF(Line). For each plant the computer program de-
termines whether the randomly generated number of lines that fail is equal to
half or more of all the lines in the plant. If so, the plant is counted as
"failed." This is repeated for all the survivors to determine the distributed
module "cut."
The sum of all plants that failed due to power module failures, com-
mon module failures, and failures of more than half the lines in the distributed
module yields the number of plants shut down due to carbon fiber impact. The
computer program then turn to plants of the next SIC number. These methods
constitute a calculation that generates a considerable increase in the variance
relative to the Phase I methodology.
Cost Impact of Business/Industry Closings
The Monte Carlo submodel described above yields the number of plants
in each SlC, size group that are shut down as the result of each simulated
accident. In order to compute the impact of those plant closings in dollar
terms we first estimate the fraction of the industry shutdown at the location
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that is affected. This is done by using an employee weighted fraction of pro-
duction lost. The expression used in the computer model is equivalent to:
(Employees) (No. of Plants Shut)
Size SlC, Size SlC,Size (7.9)
(F.C.)sIC
__] (Employees) (No. of Plants)
Size SIC,Size SIC,Size
Equation (7.9) providesan estimateof the loss in capacityor output in an
industryidentifiedby one SIC number. The numeratoris the number of employees
in those facilitiesthat are shut down in one SIC catetory;the denominatoris
the total number of employeesin the same SIC categoryat the same location.
The ORI risk assessmentmodel estimatesthe impact of plant closings
due to carbon fiber-relatedequipmentfailuresby using the Gross Domestic
Productallocatedto a particularbusiness-industrysegment. The Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) is equal to the Gross NationalProduct (GNP) debitedby the value
of foreignproductionof American companiesand creditedwith the value of pro-
duction by foreigncompaniesin the United States. In this sense it measures
the value of goods and servicesassociatedwith particularbusinessand in-
dustrial sectors in the United States. The GDP measuresmore than value of
productionalone and is thereforethe most useful readilyavailableeconomic
indicatorfor our use. GDP estimatesare publishedat the 3-digitSIC code
level on a nationalbasis by the Departmentof Commerce. In order to allocate
the GDP to the local level we used county-basedpayrolldata, publishedin the
County BusinessPatterns for individualSIC numbers. The ORI model tacitly
assumes that local productivityis essentiallyequal to the nationalaverage
productivity,on an industry-by-industrybasis. The GDP allocableto one
industryin a particularcounty is estimatedby:
(CountyPayroll)siC
(NationalPayroll) (GDP)
SIC SIC (7.10)
The economic impact (not the GDP lost) is estimatedby the productof the
expression (7.10)and FCsIC definedby Equation (7.9). One furtheradjust-
ment is required. Since the GDP data are usuallyannualizedand the payroll
data used for a common time interval it is necessaryto multiply a factor
that is the ratio of the length of time (say in numberof days) a plant or
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business facility is shut down to the number of business days in a year (de-
fined as K). We generally assume that a closing of the type contemplated here
would last one day. We therefore have
(Local Payroll)slc (GDP) (F.C.)Cost = K o
SIC (NationalPayroll) SIC SIC (7.11)SIC
As indicatedabove, county data appearing in County Business Patternswere used
for the employee and payroll information. Nationaldata from the Department
of Commerce providedthe requiredGDP inputs.
HOUSEHOLD IMPACT
The method used in Phase II is essentiallythe same as that employed
in Phase I. We estimatedthe fractionof householdsin an area that are air
conditioned(FAC) and use the methods previouslydescribedto estimate the
failure probabilityof vulnerableequipmentin air conditionedand non-air
conditionedhouseholds. The latter calculationincludesboth the failureand
ventilationparameters. Transferfunctionsfor householdsappeared in Table
5.2. If the fractionof time that a unit is operatingis T, then the number
of failures of one type of equipment is
HH x (No Equip/HH) x T x FAC x PF, AC
+ HH x (No Equip/HH) x T x (I-FA) x PF, NAC (7.12)
where HH is the number of households and PF, AC; PF, NAC are the failure
probabilities for the equipment in air conditioned and non-air conditioned
households respectively. If the repair cost for this equipment is RC dollars,
then the total estimated cost to repair all damaged equipments of a particular
class at all households at a location characterized by a single exterior ex-
plosure value, is given by:
RC x HH x (No Equip/HH) x T x \
(PF, AC FAC + PF, NAC (I-FAC)) (7.13)
The locations and numbers of residential units were obtained from the Bureau
of Census publication, County and City Data Book. Based on the latest ex-
perimental evidence our attention was limited to household television and
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high fidelity equipment. Failure parameters (E) for both were set equal to
108 fiber seconds per cubic meter; the repair costs were estimated to be $50
per television set and $I00 per high fidelity set. Updated Phase II ventila-
tion data were incorporated in the calculation (cf Table 5.2). It was further
assumed that each of these equipments would be operated about half of the time.
The equipment failure parameters and repair costs may be considered typical of
a wide range of household appliances, so that any two appliances may be con-
sidered treated, rather than the television and high fidelity sets.
AIRCRAFTVULNERABILITY
Problem Definition
In Phase I it was concluded that key airport operations were essenti-
ally invulnerable to carbon fiber incidents due to the many designed redun-
diancies in the system. The Phase I analysis did not, however, cover the risk
to aircraft on the ground at the time of the accident. Because of safety-of-
flight, as well as other factors, it was decided that an investigation should
be made of the risk to aircraft on the ground, at passenger gates and main-
tenance locations. This was initiated in Phase II, and focussed on failures
of avionics equipment.
In a cooperative effort the aircraft manufacturers analyzed data
to determine the number of aircraft expected to be at passenger boarding gates
and at maintenance locations on the airport by day and night. This was done
for the nine airports previously selected to represent the entire United States
(accounting for about one third of U.S. operations with a bias toward the
larger airports). The results of the airframer data collection effort, based
on current operations, were extrapolated to the 1993 time frame for the ORI
risk assessment. The results are shown in Table 7.2.
For the principal aircraft types the airframers reviewed all onboard
electrical and electronic equipment. For the L-IOll Tristar, for example, 600
types of equipment were surveyed, and 258 components and assemblies were iden-
tified for detailed vulnerability review. After examination of all pertinent
characteristics, 84 types of equipment were identified as susceptible to CF-
induced damage. All of these types of equipment were assigned failure para-
meters based on available experimental data, extrapolated where necessary. A
few examples from the L-IOll are shown in Table 7.3. The table reveals another
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TABLE7.2
ESTIMATEDNUMBEROFAIRCRAFTEXPOSEDONTHEGROUND- 1993
DAY NIGHT
AIC
AIRPORT SIZE GATE MAINT GATE MAINT
O'Hare/ SMALL 12 3 5 6
Chicago MED 36 0 18 11
LARGE 39 8 18 20
Kennedy/ SMALL 12 2 3 5
NewYork MED 49 0 21 65
LARGE 41 8 23 32
Lambert/ SMALL 5 1 2 1
St. Louis MED 8 0 1 0
LARGE 2 0 2 0 "
La Guardia/ SMALL 5 O 4 6
New York MED 0 0 O 13 "
LARGE 3 _O 4 O
Logun/ SMALL 4 l 5 4
Boston MED 12 O 4 0
LARGE 9 O 5 4
Phila. SMALL 2 O 3 0
Int'l./ MED 6 0 l O
Philadelphia LARGE 6 O 8 0
Washington SMALL 2 0 3 0
National/ MED 6 0 l O
Washington, D.C. LARGE 6 O 8 0 .
Hartsfield/ SMALL 9 3 8 5
Atlanta MED 32 II 23 13 --
LARGE 16 8 16 12
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TABLE7.2
ESTIMATEDNUMBEROFAIRCRAFTEXPOSEDONTHEGROUND- 1993 (Continued)
DAY NIGHT
A/C
AIRPORT SIZE GATE MAINT GATE MAINT
Miami SMALL 6 1 9 2
International / MED 34 O. 43 26
Miami LARGE 24 12 20 24
,I
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TABLE7.3!
EXAMPLESOFVULNERABLEEQUIPMENTABOARDL-IOll TRISTAR
Failure
EQUIPMENT NO. PER LOCATIONON Parameter
I.D. NO. USE AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT (E: Fiber sec/m3) Q
LI2 Radio Communication 2 Avionics Center 108
LI3 Radio Communication 3 Avionics Center 108
L32 Electric Power 1 Flight Station 108
L65 Navigation 2 Avionics Center 1.5 x 107
L69 Navigation 1 Flight Station 108
L78 Airborne Auxiliary
Power 1 Passenger Cabin 108
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important factor in the analysis, to be discussed later: similar equipments
may be installed in different parts of the aircraft. There are several diffe-
rent possible paths for fiber-laden air from the exterior to the different
onboard equipment locations.
In order to consolidate the equipment data the airframers defined an
avionics "suit" for a typical aircraft in each size category. Equipment type
classifications were made on the basis of failure parameter and repair cost
primarily, so that it was possible to reduce the total number of types of
equipment considerably by appropriate aggregation. In this way generic types
of avionics equipment were identified with onboard locations indicated for each
one, as well as mean-exposure-to-failure values, and repair costs. Table 7.4
summarizes the equipment input data prepared by the airframers: the number of
the aircraft, the failure parameter (E), and the repair costs.
As indicated above, avionics equipment is operated in several loca-
tions on the aircraft; this factor together with the possibility of various
doors and hatches being open or shut resulted in the definition of different
ventilation modes for each equipment-aircraft combination. Here again, an
independent analysis by the airframe manufacturers provided values of the
different transfer functions and the fraction of time (during day and night)
that each would be expected to prevail. These results are summarized in
Table 7.5.
Computer Methods
Figure 7.4 is a flow chart illustrating the computer submodel that
computes avionics failures and resulting costs. The first step in the com-
putation is the determination, on a stochastic basis, of whether the simulated
accident took place during the day or night. The conditional probability for
this event is based on the analysis of the airframer aircraft accident data
base. The calculation proceeds through each aircraft size in turn. For each
size aircraft the program "looks up" the number of aircraft at the predefined
gate and maintenance locations (for the airport being simulated). At each loca-
tion in-turn the number of each type of equipment in aggregated; on a random
basis the model determines the number in each of the predefined ventilation
modes (i.e., finds the applicable transfer function). With the value of the
transfer function and the exterior exposure for the particular location the
model computes the failure probability for the equipment, using the input
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TABLE7.4
AIRCRAFTAVIONICSEQUIPMENTCONFIGURATIONSWITHFAILUREANDCOSTINPUTS
N
Avionics E
Aircraft Equipment Numberon (Failure Repair Cost
Size ORI I.D. No. Aircraft Parameter*) ($) °
1 38 108 I00
2 7 1.5 x 107 I00
Small 3 6 108 450
4 2 1.5 x 107 450
5 1 I08 3OO
6 18 108 50
7 26 1.5 x 107 215
8 24 iO8 220
Medium 9 153 108 175
& I0 4 108 250
Large II 22 108 210
12 43 108 385
13 3 108 530
14 2 108 1295
15 4 108 1665
*In fiber-seconds per cubic meter.
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TABLE7.5
VENTILATIONFACTORS(T.F.) ANDASSOCIATEDPROBABILITIESFORAVIONICS
EQUIPMENTABOARDPARKEDAIRCRAFTBY LOCATIONANDTIME OF DAY
Gate Maintenance
Day Night Day & Night
Equip.
No. Prob. T.F. Prob. T.F. Prob. T.F.
1 - .99 .70 .70 .70 .23 .70
4 .01 1.0 .30 1.0 .77 1.0
5, 6 .99 .70 1.0 .70 .96 .70
.01 .0025 ,04 .0025
7 .95 .0025 .20 .0025 .79 1.0
.01 1.0 .50 .01 .14 .01
.04 .01 .30 1.0 .07 .0025
8 1.0 .01 1.0 .01 1.0 .01
9, I0 .99 .01 1.0 .01 .96 .01
.01 .0025 .04 .0025
II - .95 .0025 .20 .0025 .78 1.0
15 .01 1.0 .50 .01 .14 .01
.04 .01 .30 1.0 .08 .0025
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value of E. Using a Poisson distribution the actual number of failures is ob-
tained in a random draw. Using the input repair cost for the equipment the
computer model then determines the total repair cost. This procedure is re-
peated for each type of equipment on one size aircraft, then done for the
other size aircraft, then repeated at the next location.
COSTINGSUMMARY
The input requirements for the business/industry impact cost model
are summarized in Table 7.6. All counties within 50 miles of the airport are
defined by a set of geographical coordinates. At one geographical location
the model computes business-industry impact as the:sum of costs of equipment
repair, facility cleanup, and business disruption. At those locations defined
as residential centers the model computes the total cost due to household equip-
ment failures. At the airport itself the model computes costs required to
repair failed avionics equipment. Summaryresults for each simulated accident
present the total of costs in each of these three major categories, obtained
by adding the costs over all geographical locations affected by the simulated
accident.
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TABLE7.6
SUMMARY
BUSINESS/INDUSTRYIMPACTCOSTMODEL
INPUTREQUIREMENTS
Level Descriptor Input Definition
National SlC Number Payroll .
Gross Domestic Product
County SIC Number Local Payroll
No. of Establishments by Size
Facility SIC Number No. of Equipments by Type
& Size Plant Configuration
Cleanup Cost
Equipment Standard Type Repair Cost
MeanExposure-to-Failure
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VIII. INDIVIDUALAIRPORTRESULTS
The simulation model was run for a large sample of accidents at the
following nine airports previously examined in Phase I:
O'Hare/Chicago
John F. Kennedy/New York City
Washington National Airport/Washington, D.C.
Lambert/St. Louis
LaGuardia/New York City
Logan/Boston
Hartsfield/Atlanta
Miami International/Miami
Philadelphia International/Philadelphia.
SAMPLEACCIDENT
To set the stage for interpreting the airport simulation statistics
we present detailed output for one random accident generated at Kennedy Air-
port. The basic geometry is shown in Figure_8.1; the airport and accident
location are indicated. Randomly generated weather data are: wind from the
south at 2 meters per second and stability class 6. The accident, based on
8-I
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Figure 8.1 Basic Geography Associated With One RandomAccident At
Kennedy Airport in New York. Airplane shows airport
location; asterisk indicates accident location, The
circle represents Queens County for modelling purposes.
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randomly-selectedfactors involveda large jet (type 16) with 3000 kilograms
of compositeaboard; 1.3 x lOlO fiberswere releasedin a take-off accident,
with the plume formed during the fire limited to a height of lO0 meters by
an inversion. As a result the mean exposure in Queens County is 3.5 x lO4
fiber-secondsper cubic meter; no other neighboringcountieswere significantly
affected.
The resultsfor this one accident includethe computedcost of re-
pairs to householdequipmentin Queens of $533. The impact on business com-
prises $5,600 in equipmentrepair costs and $31,577due to businessclosings
and cleanup as the result of equipmentfailure.
SIMULATIONOUTPUTS
A typicalset of runs includesapproximately2500 simulatedaccidents,
each generatingdata of the type presentedabove for one accident. The com-
puter programsummarizesthe data from all simulatedaccidentsto providethe
followingoutputs:
e Characteristicsof the ten most costly accidents
e Probabilitydistributionof annual costs for household,in-
dustrial,and avionics,as well as the mean, standard devia-
tion, and risk profile
e Probabilitydistributionof costs per accidentfor household,
industrial,and avionics impactsto provide: mean, standard
deviation,and risk profile
• Distributionof numberof accidentsper year (replication).
Availableoptionspermit printingout the detailsassociatedwith each accident,
as presentedabove. A standard printoutfor a sample (annualreplications)re-
sults for 34,000 replicationsat KennedyAirport appearsin Figure8.2. The
resultsindicatethat, for example, in 7 runs the total cost was greater than
$I00, and less than $178, as shown in the column headed "TOTAL COUNTS." The
class intervalswere selected to be equal on a logarithmicscale to facilitate
computingthe risk profiles,essentiallycumulativeprobabilitydistributions.
The risk profiles for annual householdavionicsfailures,and business-industry
impact plottedfrom these output data appear in Figure 8.3.
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Figure 8.3 Annual Risk Profiles for Kennedy Airport - 1993: Business/
Industry, Household Equipment, and Avionics Equipment Impacts;
and Total Impact.
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COMPARISONOF DIFFERENTAIRPORTS
In this section representative results are summarized for the nine
airports listed above. For each airport the number of samples (replications)
was selected so that at least 2500 accidents were simulated. Computer time
is directly proportional to the number of accidents being simulated, and com-
parability of results for different airports required a commonbasis. Re-
sults presented below show the impact of changing this number.
Table 8.1 summarizes the results of all the single airport accident
simulations. The table presents accident data as contrasted with annual data.
The probability of more than one accident per year is so small, however, that
the average of results over all accidents is essentially equal to the average
of results over all simulated years. In each set of runs the program presents
detailed information about the ten worst (highest cost) accidents. The aver-
age of the ten highest-cost accidents at each of the airports also appears in
the table. At each airport these ten accidents (0.4 percent of all simulated
accidents) comprise the highest cost.
The results in Table 8.1 show that, typically, the costs resulting
from business and industrial impact are considerably greater than the house-
hold impact costs and the avionics failure costs. All mean costs appear rela-
tively small. To present some idea of the range of these results we note here
that the maximumcost in each of the three categories and the airport at which
it occurred are:
• Households: $2,665 at Kennedy Airport, New York
e Business-lndustry: $274,000 at Logan Airport, Boston
• Avionics: $3,910 at Kennedy Airport, New York.
As indicated, these represent results from 2500 accident simulations at each
airport, so that these extreme values were experienced with an empirical
frequency of 4 in ten thousand. The extreme values quoted here are actually
the maxima from a sample of approximately 9x2500 or 22,500 accidents. The
likelihood of an accident with fire in any year Is quite low; the extreme values
reported for Kennedy airport and Logan airport would have occurred only once
in 34,000 years and once in 67,000 years, respectively.
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TABLE8.1 - 1993 RESULTSFORSIMULATEDACCIDENTSAT NINE AIRPORTS(1976 DOLLARS)
Mean Cost
Airport/City Household Bus/Ind. Avionics Mean of I0 Worst
Atlanta 1 70 2 14,218
Boston 2 152 0 35,818
Wash. Nat'l. 5 310 0 62,497
Kennedy II 199 3 32,544
LaGuardia II 373 0 56,186I
Miami 2 28 1 7,566
Chicago 6 162 ' 1 32,510
Philadelphia 7 192 0 28,971
St. Louis 2 67 0 13,779
NOTE: Approximately 2500 accidents simulated for each airport.
The computer simulation model also generates all the results needed
to plot the risk profiles, as shown previously in the sample printout appearing
as Figure 8.2. The risk profile is typically presented on an annual basis.
Figure 8.4 shows the annual risk profiles for O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Lambert
Airport, St. Louis, and Hartsfield Airport, Atlanta. O'Hare/Chicago, the
Nation's busiest airport, has a risk profile that shows that the probability of
exceeding $I0,000 per year in total CF-related impact is approximately .0004.
For St. Louis, the corresponding probability is approximately .0001 (one in
I0,000). These three airports constitute a sample of different combinations
of annual commercial operations and surrounding population, as summarized
here:
O'Hare (ORD): High population, heavy air traffic
Hartsfield (ATL): Low population; high traffic level
Lambert (STL): Low population, low traffic level.
This stratification is reflected in the annual risk profiles. The O'Hare risk
is highest, St. Louis lowest.
The Phase II computer program was modified to generate statistics
on a per-accident basis as well as the customary per-year basis. Figure 8.5
shows the accident risk profiles for the same three airports. The risk is
greatest for O'Hare, due to the relatively high concentration of business
and industry; the St. Louis and Atlanta risk profiles are quite similar, in-
dicating that their separation in Figure 8.4 was due to the difference in
accident incidence (i.e. in our model, the difference in number of operations).
The accident risk profiles may be considered conditional probabilities. For
example, given that a CF-built aircraft crashes and burns at O'Hare Airport
the probability is 1 in a hundred (.01) that the impact will exceed one thous-
and dollars ($I,000); for $I00,000 the probability is 2 in one hundred thous-
and (.00002), by extrapolation from Figure 8.5.
STATISTICAL CONFIDENCELIMITS
In Phase I ORI shows that the simulation runs for one airport may be
considered a set of Bernoulli trials. As a result we derived the following
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Figure 8.4 Annual Risk Profiles - 1993 Scenario - for O'Hare/Chicago
(ORD). Hartsfield/Atlanta (ATL) and Lambert/St. Louis (STL)
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expression for the 95% statistical confidence limits:
where p is the computed exceedance probability after simulating n samples.
Figure 8.6 shows the Washington National Airport risk profile with the 95%
confidence limits. The confidence limits apply to the purely statistical
nature of the simulation, and not to the impact of errors in input data. The
results do show that conclusions based on the risk profiles need not be
altered because of inherent statistical uncertainty. The confidence limit
bars shown on the graph appear to not be of equal size above and below the
curve due to fact that the results are plotted on a logarithumic scale.
ADEQUACYOF SAMPLESIZE
In a major simulation modelling effort of the type reported here one
of the important questions is whether enough runs have been made. This is
related to the stability of the model and variance in the input data. Rather
than invoke sophisticated statistical arguments it is more convenient to let
the results "speak for themselves." In effect we compared the results for
two different numbers of simulation runs.
The O'Hare Airport/Chicago simulation was run for 22,000 and 44,000
annual samples, resulting in 2537 and 5038 accidents respectively. It is not
possible to compare the two risk profiles on a graph using a scale convenient
for this report, since they would be too close to one another. Weare there-
fore limited to the results summarized in Table 8.2. A significantly larger-
cost accident occurred in the 44,000-sample run than in the 22,000-sample run
which is typical of extreme-value statistics. In this case the contribution
of the larger accident results in the mean values being somewhat different.
The risk probabilities are, however, quite similar. It is also interesting to
note that five of the ten highest-cost accidents in the 44,000-sample run oc-
curred in "second half", i.e., in samples after number 22,000.
SENSITIVITY TESTS
To demonstrate the flexibility of the ORI Carbon Fiber Risk Assess-
ment Model, as well as to provide insight into the physical mechanisms at work,
several input parameters were varied and the impact of the variation on the out-
put examined. These results are described in this section of the report.
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TABLE8.2
1993 CHICAGO/O'HARECOMPARISONF DIFFERENTSETSOF SIMULATIONS
Measure 22,000 Samples 44,000 Samples
No. of Accidents 2537 5038
MeanAccident $147 $166
Worst Accident $54,000 $110,299
P (Annual Cost >$I000) .000955 .00111
P (Annual Cost>$10,O00) .000545 .000545
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Inversion "Punch Through"
It is assumed in the results reported so far that the plume does not
penetrate the inversion. For one set of Washington National Airport simulations
we permitted the plume to "punch through" the inversion. This was a rela-
tively simple program modification to introduce, since the standard model in-
cludes a test comparing the computed plume height with the inversion height.
If the initially-computed plume height is greater it is reduced and set equal
to the inversion height for the remainder of the calculation. In the sensitivity
test reported here this comparison was bypassed and the computed plume height
was used, regardless of its magnitude relative to the height of the inversion.
The results for Washington National Airport indicate risks so low
compared to the base case that no risk profileswere drawn. It is only neces-
sary to cite a few values to make the point. In the test case, with punching
through permitted, the probability of exceeding $I00 per year in CF - impact
costs was .000045 compared to the 1993 Washington National Airport base case
(no punch-through) value of .003, roughly a difference by a factor of twenty.
For exceeding $I000 per year the corresponding probabilities are .000015
(punch through) and .00048 (no punch through). In the test cases the mean
annual accident cost is reported as zero (actually less than 50¢) compared to
$12 in the standard case. Another way of reporting these results is that, of
2590 random accidents generated in the "punch-through" runs, only three had
associated CF-related costs of more than $I00.
One interesting result relates to the stability class associated
with the ten most costly accidents. In the base case these are all class 6
or class 5, - the most stable atmospheric conditions; these stability classes
are characterized by a lO0-meter inversion height. In the standard simulations
this was also the height at which the plume was stopped. For the "punch-
through" runs the ten most costly accidents are associated with stability class
6 although the average plume height was 437 meters; the average cost incurred
in these ten costliest accidents was $571, compared to $62,497 (cf. Table 8.1)
in the base case.
RandomInversion Height
In other results presented in this report the inversion height is
linked to the stability class by a one-to-one relationship for each airport.
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This is, in each of the airport accident simulations the random selection of
i
the atmospheric stability category automatically determines the height of the
inversion (cf. Section IV). As called for in the Phase II contract ORI tested
the effect of this approach by devising a methodology to provide for a random
selection of the inversion height. This was done by first associating the
different stability classes with the period of the day during which each is
most likely to occur. For example, stability classes 4, 5, and 6 usually pre-
vail during the night. The previously developed values of the inversion
height were selected as the values prevailing at the midpoints of each of the
appropriate time intervals and were then connected by straight line segments.
The actual inversion height was then determined by a random selection from
that part of the continuous inversion height-time relationship appropriate to
the randomly-selected stability class.
The resulting risk profiles are compared in Figure 8.7 for the 1993
Washington National Airport scenario. The standard, fixed inversion height
per stability class case is characterized by a somewhat higher risk, showing
that the method previously used is relatively conservative. The annual mean
impact is $12 for the fixed inversion height case and drops to $5 in the vari-
able inversion height case. The corresponding average impacts of the ten
worst accidents are $62,497 and $28,994, respectively. It also turned out
that, in the variable inversion height runs, the ten worst accidents were
associated with stability classes 5 and 6, the most stable, although the in-
version height was not always set at I00 meters as it is in the standard runs
for these stability classes.
O'Hare Airport "Worst Case"
In order to examine the impact of a drastic change in the underlying
assumptions the O'Hare Airport 1993 scenario simulations were run with the in-
puts changed so that all aircraft operations involved aircraft "loaded" with
CF. In order to do this conveniently the inputs were adjusted so that all air-
craft operating at O'Hare in 1993 with CF in their structure were our previously
defined type number 19 (cf. Table 2.2). This is a large jet with the most CF
composite of any plane expected be in the 1993 fleet; the total onboard is
15,600 kilograms. The average amount of composite aboard all 1993 aircraft is
only about 2,800 kilograms per aircraft with composite while the range is from
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65 to 15,600, for the aircraft with composite. The worst-case scenario effec-
tively increases the amount of carbon fiber liberated in an accident by a fac-
tor of approximately five, on the average. Several of the output results from
the two sets of simulation runs are compared in Table 8.3. The interesting
result is that the mean annual impact and the mean accident cost each increase
by a factor of approximately ten due to the average increase in CF-release
of a factor of about five. In the case of the ten most costly accidents the
ratio of the mean impacts is approximately 2.5. The average amount of com-
posite released in the ten most costly accidents for the worst-case scenario
is about 5.8 times the average for the corresponding best-estimate cases.
The results for the probabilities shown in Table 8.3 indicate that
the effect of the increase in the average amount of fiber per aircraft is to
shift the peak of the frequency distribution of accident impact to the right;
the most trival accidents have been eliminated and this causes the larger
shift in the mean values. In the standard runs the standard deviation of annual
impact is equal to about 40 times the annual mean impact; in the worst case this
ratio is about 15. The best-estimate 1993 O'Hare annual risk profile is com-
pared with worst case in Figure 8.8. The comparison shows the significant
impact of the increased carbon fiber. However, the probability of exceeding
$I0,000 in annual damages is only about .005 (five in a thousand), which is
also indicated in Table 8.3.
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TABLE8.3
COMPARISONOF SELECTEDOUTPUTS: O'HAREAIRPORT, 1993, BEST-ESTIMATE
AIRCRAFTMIX AND ALL AIRCRAFT"LOADED"
Standard Worst-Case
ResultMeasure Average A/C: 2800 kg CF A_ A/C: 15,600 kg CF
Mean Annual Impact $17 $172
Mean Impactper Accident $I_7 $1408
Mean of Ten Most Costly Accidents $28,842 $68,383
Prob of Annual Impact>$I0,000 .0005 .0045
I
Prob of Accident Impact>$50,000 .0002 .0066
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Figure 8.8 1993 Chicago/O'Hare Annual Risk Profile Compared to "Worst
Case."
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IX. NATIONALRISK
In Phase I ORI used a mathematical technique called a convolution
to generate the national risk profile. This method used as its input the final
results of the airport simulations: the risk profiles, or probability dis-
tributions. In Phase II a somewhat more straightforward approach was used,
which takes as its input the individual accident results generated for each
of the airports. The method is described in more detail below, followed by
a presentation of the results.
METHOD
The airports previously treated, and listed in Section VIII, account
for approximately one-third of the Nation's commercial air traffic. To compute
the national risk it is assumed that these airports can be used with suitable
adjustment to represent the entire United States, at least as far as commer-
cial aircraft-related CF risk is concerned. Since these are predominantly
large, busy airports near large metropolitan areas, this method may be
expected to overestimate the national risk; for our purposes this constitutes
a conservative, and therefore desirable, result.
We have already discussed our method of estimating the average
number of accidents in the U.S. in one year involving commercial aircraft
with CF aboard in a fire (cf section II). In conducting a national simulation
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we assume that the actual number of accidents in a year obeys a Poisson distri-
bution with mean equal to 2.6. The ORI national risk model then draws a number
of accidents at random from this distribution. The method is illustrated in
Figure 9.1. Each of the accidents in a year (one replication) is assigned to
one of the airports previously examined. The probability that the accident
takes place at one airport is simply the ratio of the number of operations at
that airport to the total for all nine airports. This again biases the results
in favor of the relatively busy airports we examined previously, and this errs
in the conservative direction. The important concept in this method is that
the details of the individual aircraft accidents previously simulated at
all nine airports are saved and used here. Figure 9.2 is a conceptual repre-
sentation of the file for one airport's simulated accident. In the national
calculation we simply draw one of these accidents at random off the list for
the airport to which the national model has allocated the accident. This pro-
cess is repeated for all accidents in the replication (i.e., simulated year).
The sum of costs over all accidents in one year's sample is a conservative
estimate of the total national impact.
RESULTS
The results of the calculation, using outputs from the individual
airports, and the weighting factors described above, indicate a maximumannual
impact on business and industry of $274,000, with a mean of $466. For avionics
impact the results are $3,900 and $2, respectively. The method is entirely
analogous to that used for the single airports in the sense of being Bernoulli
trials, and, therefore, our previous method of computing confidence limits can
be used. In this case we typically simulated about I0,000 "national years."
The national risk profile with the 95% statistical confidence limits
is shown in Figure 9-3. The risk profile indicates that the probability of
exceeding $I0,000 per year in CF-related impact is about 1 in a hundred (.01).
The statistical confidence limits indicate that the probability is .95 that the
actual probability in this case is between .0133 and .00867. The sensitivity
tests reported previously for one airport indicate that, with relatively drastic
worst-case inputs the results do not change dramatically, thus increasing our
overall confidence in the national results presented here. In Figure 9.4 the
Phase I and Phase II results are compared, showing that the new Phase II inputs
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result in a greatly reduced estimated risk, despite the fact that the Phase II
model is considerably more likely to generate results with a large variance
(extreme values).
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X. SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS
ORI, Inc., has developed and demonstrated a general stochastic risk
assessment model. This model has been applied to the assessment of the risk
associated with proposed applications of carbon fiber composite materials in
commercial aircraft structures. The airport risk model replicates key elements
of the accident scenario (i.e. fire, plume, diffusion and transport, transfer,
equipment failure, and economic impact) in a logic structure that supports the
calculation of statistical measures of the risk. The national risk is designed
to use the results from several individual airport-city calculations.
One of the principal changes from Phase I to Phase II has been the
availability of improved input data, particularly for key parameters associated
with the amount of fiber in a projected aircraft, the fraction of carbon fiber
released in a burn, and the vulnerability of electronic equipment. Where sound
experimental data is not available we have always taken a conservative approach;
that is, the inputs are selected so as to maximize the estimated risk. Experi-
mental data indicates that the exponential law tends to overestimate the prob-
- ability of equipment failure for low values of carbon fiber exposure. Wehave
used the exponential law, since it is relatively simple, and is conservative.
< The model has been subjected to a variety of tests all showing its
inherent stability. We have developed statistical confidence bounds about our
I0-I
risk probabilities. The model outputs have been subject to a varietyof sen-
sitivity tests; these have shown that even when drasticunrealisticshifts in
the input data are introducedthe resultingannual risk increasesby less than
a factor of ten.
The national model was run using nine relatively busy airports heavi-
ly weighted toward those with large concentrations of business and industry,
and thus overestimates the national risk. Even in that case, the chance of ex-
ceeding an annual economic impact of more than $100,000 due to aircraft-fire
accidents and subsequent carbon fiber release is less than one in a thousand.
A worst-case analysis of the possible impact of such accidents on the electric
power distribution system showed that the expected number of outages would be
negligible compared to outages due to other causes.
Our conclusion, based on the results presented earlier in this re-
port, and summarized briefly above is that:
The risk due to accidental release of carbon fibers following an
accident and fire involvin 9 civil aircraft is quite small.
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APPENDIXA
THE EFFECTSOF CARBONFIBER
EXPOSUREONELECTRICUTILITY SYSTEMS
INTRODUCTION
Objectives
This study assesses the expected impacts of the exposure of an
electric utility system to carbon graphite fibers in response to the combined
requirements of Tasks 8E and 9 of the scope of work: I/
• Task 8E - "is directed toward the assessment of the likelihood
of failures of the electric power distribution system due to
carbon fiber release accidents. Information is available that
relates failures of individual critical components of the sys-
tem to different levels of carbon fiber exposure."
• Task 9 - "In order to properly assess the possible impact of car-
bon fiber incidents on the national power supply system, it is
necessary to develop a historical perspective on previous break-
downs of the system."
Scope
Based on a review of literature and visits to operating electric
utilities, for Task 8E we have defined typical electric power distribution
l--/Certain measurements in this Appendix are in English Units. The following
factors may be used to convert these measurements to Sl Units: (1) kilometer =
0.62 mile; (2) square kilometer = 0.3861 square mile.
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systems in the 2.4KV-38KV range, using actual distribution circuits to the
maximumextent possible. Using CF exposure failure threshold (E) values pro-
vided by Westinghouse Electric Companyfor various types of insulators and
bushings, expected customer outages due to CF are estimated for the typical
distribution circuits.
Using published information and visits to electric utilities and
to selected industrial facilities, for Task 9 we have estimated the frequency
and duration of failures to power systems and described the protective measures
taken by both the utilities and by business and industrial users. This infor-
mation is used as a baseline against which to assess the expected outages due
to exposure to carbon fibers.
Background
Tests which have been performed by the U.S. Army Ballistics Research
Laboratory and by the Westinghouse Electric Companyindicate that the effects
of carbon fibers on electrical systems operating in excess of about 38KV can
be neglected. Likewise, the effects of carbon fiber exposure on the secondary
side of distribution transformers serving industries, businesses and residences
are addressed as a part of the general NASAassessment of carbon fiber risks,
described in the main body of this report. There is a need to analyze the
potential risks due to CF exposure primary distribution circuits which operate
in the 2.4KV to 38KV range.
Tests have been performed by Westinghouse Electric Companyon var-
ious types of insulators and bushings operating at 7.5KV, 15KV, and 34.5KV
and exposed to various lengths of carbon fiber. These tests which are summarized
in the final section of this Appendix provide the basic inputs to this analysis.
Rationale
The risks are defined in terms of outage frequencies with and without
exposure to carbon fiber. All effects of carbon fiber exposure are estimated
on the basis of 3mm-length fiber segments. Power systems, typical distribution
systems, and some protective measures are first described. General reliability
considerations together with outage data, are then discussed. Finally, esti-
mates of the effects of CF exposure are made on the basis of a typical circuit
in the 7.5KV range and an actual 23KV circuit.
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DESCRIPTIONOF POWERSYSTEMS(References I, 2, 3, 4)
lllustrative Power System
Figure A.I is an illustrative power distribution system consisting of
transmission circuits, subtransmission circuits, and primary feeders. Sta-
tions A, B, and C are bulk power stations interconnected by a transmission net-
work. The distribution system is that portion of the power system which inter-
connects the customer service connections with the bulk power sources. In
Figure A.I, this includes the subtransmission network, Station D, and the primary
feeders. In some systems radial subtransmission circuits may be used or a
loop arrangement, in which the transmission circuit connects (loops to) several
distribution stations and returns tG the bulk station, may be used. Often
the primary feeders are connected directly to a bulk station without use of
intermediate subtransmission voltages. It should also be noted that major
power users such as large industrial plants may be fed directly from trans-
mission or subtransmission circuits rather than from primary feeders. In this
case, the industrial plants' substations are equivalent to the distribution
substation.
Circuit breakers are usually located as shown except that the breakers
on the high voltage side of a transformer bank are often omitted because of the
high reliability of transformers. Bus tie breakers such as those at Station A
are used where bus sectionalizing in the event of a fault is justified. Bulk
power outages are usually due to interruptions in the transmission network
except for events such as tornadoes that affect large portions of the distri-
bution system. Failures due to CF exposure are expected to occur mainly at
the primary feeders; however, in some systems the subtransmission circuits
operate at voltages below 38KV and might also be susceptible.
lllustrative Distribution Networks
As mentioned above, the oistribution system generally consists of dis-
tribution stations connected to bulk seurces via subtransmission circuits and
connected to the customers by primary feeders. Subtransmission circuits may
be radial, loop or network configurations. Likewise, the primary feeders may
be radial, loop, or network configurations. The distribution transformers may
be 3 phase for industrial or commercial establishments or may be single phase-
to-ground to supply residential circuits. Secondary voltages are usually
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230/I15V and are not considered in this analysis. Figure A.2 shows a typical
radial distribution feeder in some detail (from Reference 4).
A fault due to CF exposure on a primary feeder can be expected to
open the feeder at the nearest protective device (fuse or breaker) toward the
source (or sources), thus cutting off all loads downstream from the fuse or
breaker.
Figure 3 shows a typical distribution circuit for single family
residences in an urban or suburban area. A single phase 230/I15V, 3-wire
secondary circuit is fed from a three-phase primary feeder by a distribution
transformer at each end of an isolated secondary circuit. Each distribution
transformer is connected to the primary feeder through a fused disconnect.
The isolated secondary circuit may be extended to include other distribution
transformers connected in the same manner. Other single phase isolated
secondaries will be connected to other phases of the primary feeder in order
to balance the loads between phases.
In some residential areas, each isolated secondary is supplied by a
single transformer and often in rural areas a distribution transformer will
supply a single residence. A commondistribution system for commerical areas
uses three-phase transformers supplying each establishment directly from the
primary feeder, as shown in Figure A.3.
Insulators and Bushings
A flashover due to carbon fibers on any insulator or bushing will
cause a failure to the entire circuit associated with that insulator or
bushing. The circuit in this case is defined as that portion of the system
protected by an associated fuse or circuit breaker. For the case of a pri-
mary feeder, a fault on any phase will fail all three phases. For the case
of a single-phase fused lateral circuit, a fault will only affect the par-
ticular single phase faulted.
A count of the number of distribution transformers, disconnects,
etc. in a distribution circuit is available from distribution circuit maps;
however, a count of the actual number of pin insulators is not usually
directly available (poles are usually not shown). The number of bushings can
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be obtained from the number of transformers and line capacitors, while the
number of post type insulators can be obtained from the number of disconnect
switches and fuses.
The number of pin (or line-post) insulators is proportional
to the number of poles, which can be estimated with sufficient accuracy for this
study on a per mile basis. The following visual observations have been made
in the Washington, D.C. area for urban, suburban, and rural primary feeders
owned by PEPCO,VEPCO,and Baltimore Gas and Electric Company:
• In urban areas there are about 60-80 poles per mile and in
suburban areas there are about 30-40 poles per mile with pole
spacings dependent on the location of customers and street inter-
sections. In rural areas the poles average about 20-30 per mile,
depending on design span widths.
e Each pole has 1 pin insulator (or line-post) per phase of primary
feeder. Each distribution transformer has 1 vertical bushing per
phase plus 2 post insulators for fused cut-outs. Each capacitor
bank has 2 vertical bushings per capacitor and each disconnect
switch has 2 post insulators per switch. °
PROTECTIVEMEASURES
The protective measures include devices and procedures used by both
the utility and its customers. These measures are of interest to this
problem to the extent that they affect the probability of an outage given
a failure, the duration of the outage, and the impact of an outage of given
duration.
Generation/Transmission Systems
Protective measures at this system level are only of background
interest to this analysis. Faults due to CF on distribution circuits in
the 2.4KV-38KV range will normally be cleared at the distribution level _
and will not affect the generation/transmission system. Note that high
load/long duration outages affecting the generation/transmission system
are included in the bulk outage data discussed later.
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Protection measures at the bulk level include automatic operation of
breakers to disconnect faults, load shedding and generator dropping practices,
schemes for bringing spinning reserves onto line, means for obtaining emergency
start up in the event of system outages, etc. The automatic opening and closing
of breakers is the "first line of defense" in the event of unexpected faults
and is of more interest to this study than other protective measures.
Some automatic generation/transmission system protective measures are
described below for background purposes:
e Generators are protected from internal faults by means of percent
differential (current balance) relays which insure that all
secondary _-_ + _-G currents are equal. Generators are also
protected for overspeed, overload, anti-motoring, loss of field,
and high temperatures.
e Power Transformers are protected by _-_ + _-G differential, over-
current, and thermal relays.
• Station Buses have percent differential protection to protect
against _-_ and _-G faults anywhere on the bus.
• Transmission lines are protected by directional overcurrent
relays and impedance (distance) relays at the station at each
end. These relays also provide backup in the event of a failure
to clear faults at adjacent stations and lines. Breakers are
normally programmed to open in about 5 cycles and reclose in
about 15 cycles in nrder to clear lightning strikes without power
interruption.
Distribution System
Subtransmission lines which carry high distribution loads at relatively
high voltages will be protected by means similar to the bulk transmission lines.
When a single radial subtransmission line feeds a distribution station, the
breaker at the distribution station end of the line may be omitted with protec-
tion provided by the breaker at the supply end only. This breaker will open
for any faults on the upstream side of the primary feeder breaker and will pro-
vide backup to the primary feeder breakers. Primary feeder breakers are con-
trolled by overcurrent relays for each phase and for phase-to-ground currents.
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Three automatic reclosures followed by a lockout (in the event of a sustained
fault) is common.
Fuses in subfeeders and laterals are usually designed to open prior
to operation of the primary feeder breaker while fuses on the distribution
transformers are designed to open prior to damage to the lateral fuses, etc.
Therefore, insulator or bushing flashovers due to carbon fibers will affect
only that portion of the feeder protected by the next protective device toward
the source from the fault.
Customer Response to Power OutaQes
Tables A.I and A.2 from Ref. (5) summarize types of responses of resi-
dential, commercial, and industrial customers to electric utility power out-
ages based on experience in the Pacific Northwest.
ORI surveys of businesses and industries showed a wide variety of
protective measures. Facilities in which power continuity is absolutely
necessary (e.g., hospital_, air traffic control centers, many chemical plants,
radio stations, etc.) have auxiliary generators for backup. However, other
industries we surveyed provided no backup power even though power out-
ages lasting more than a few minutes would be costly. Examples include a
large truck engine plant, publishing companies, etc. The rationale for this
is the extremely high utility reliability that these facilities have experienced
in the past coupled with the high cost of auxiliary power. In one or two in-
stances in which the locations permitted, large industries were supplied by
more than one primary feeder circuit.
GENERALRELIABILITY CONSIDERATIONSAND ESTIMATESFORA TYPICAL DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM
Reliability Measures (Ref. 5, 6)
Commonlyapplied measures of power systems reliability include
the Loss of Load Probability (LOLP) and the Frequency and Duration measure
(FAD). The LOLP accounts for the total fraction of time that a power sys-
tem is expected to have a deficit without regard to the distribution of J
outage durations. The FAD, on the other hand, accounts for both the fre-
quency and the duration of the outages. It is desirable to account also
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TABLE A. 1
SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL CONSUMER RESPONSES
TO LOWER ELECTRIC POWER RELIABILITY
Consumer Function Response
Residential Heating Firewood stored, oll or gas heat
Refrigeration Dry Ice
Lighting Candles, flashlights
Cooking Camp stove
Commercial Lighting Batteries, standby generators
Data processing UPS (Uninterrupted Power Supply)
standby generators
Refrigeration Standby generators
Industrial Electric drive Standby generators
Lighting Batteries
Space conditioning Nonelectric heating & cooling
TABLE A.2
SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED CONSUMER RESPONSES TO LOWER RELIABILITY
LEVELS, AS A FUNCTION OF FREQUENCY AND DURATION
Total Consumer Response
Outage Industrial Commercial Residential
144 min/ Emergency equipment Emergency equipment No response
year installed
288 min/ Non-electrlc equipment Non-electrlc equip- No response
year installed ment installed
1440 mln/ Standby generator Standby generator Emergency
year installed installed equipment
installed
Source: Impacts from a Decrease in Electric Power Service Reliability
Stanford Research Institute, June 1976.
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for the class of customers affected (residential, commercial, industrial) and
for the size of the loads lost. However, in general, data are not sufficient
for this level of detail.
Analysis of Bulk Outage Data (Ref. 5, 7, 8, 9)
Bulk power outages are defined under FPC Order 331-I, as interrup- -,
tions of a generating unit or electrical facility operating at a nominal volt-
age of 69KV or higher and resulting in a load loss of 15 minutes or longer of
at least I00 megawatts. Smaller systems must report to DOEif one half
or more of the annual system peak is involved. (Ref. 5, 9).
During CY 1978 there were 62 bulk outages reported (Ref. 9). These
involved a loss of about 12,155 MWand 65,000 MWHto about 3.1 million cus-
tomers. The distribution of outage duration by number of outages, customers
affected, customer-hours lost, and loads are summarized in Table A.3. Figure A.4
shows the percent distribution of customers affected by various duration times.
These reflect outages only, not counting load reduction measures. When ranges
of outage times were given, a midpoint value was used.
If it is assumed that all 63.4 x 106 households and 4.1 x 106 com-
mercial business establishments are utility customers, then about 4.6% of all °
customers were affected by bulk outages in 1978. This neglects the fact that
some customers were affected by more than one bulk outage during 1978.
Reference 9 reports the following distribution of bulk outages by customer
types:
Residential 55%
Commercial 30%
Industrial 25%
The number of feeders required in an area is primarily a function
of the peak loads, with a typical feeder handling 2-3MW. Bulk outages will
usually drop a large number of feeders, and the fraction of feeders dropped
is roughly proportional to the fraction of loads dropped. If it is assumed
that bulk outages are randomly distributed among feeders, then the annual
likelihood of a particular feeder being dropped is approximately equal to
the fraction of feeders dropped per year. At an average U.S. load of about
350,O00MW,the 12,157MWload dropped due to 1978 bulk outages represents
about 3.4% of the feeders so that the likelihood of a feeder being dropped
due to a bulk outage is approximately .034 per year.
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TABLEA.3. DISTRIBUTIONOF BULKPOWEROUTAGESCY 1978
OUTAG E NO. CUSTOMERS CUSTOMER- LOAD
DURATION OF AFFECTED HOURS LOST LOST
(Hours-Days) OUTAGES (Thousands) (Thousands) (MW)
• 0-1 Hours 35 1612 895 6879
1-3 " 13 410 465 2635
3-6 " 5 344 2217 1459
6-12 " 4 145 1722 678
12-24 " 3 72 759 183
1-5 Days 1 200 9600 323
5-10 " 1 300 43,200 Not Available
TOTAL 62 3083 58,858 12,157
100.
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Outages Due to Normal Equipment Failures
Estimates of outages due to normal equipment failures (not in the
presence of carbon fibers ) can be made by applying equipment failure data
to "typical" distribution systems.
FigureA.5 shows a one-linediagramof a "typical"distributioncir-
cuit. This circuitwhich feeds an urban residentialarea consistsof 3
circuit-milesof three-phaseprimary feeder, 16 circuitmiles of three-
phase subfeeders,and 8 circuitmiles of single-phaselateral feeders.
These circuitssupply 4000 homes through 398 distributiontransformers.
Sectionalizingfuses are provided in each subfeederand lateraland at
the load midpoint of the primaryfeeder. One or more normally-openmanual
tie-switchespermit interconnectionto other feeders in the event of an
emergency.
The expectedoutages (Eo) per customer (or per distribution
transformer)can be estimatedfrom:
Eo = _ Ei Fii
where:
Ei = outages in section i
Fi = fractionof customers (or transformers)affected by an
outage of sectioni
and:
Ei = _i (t)
_i = failure rate of equipment in section i
t = time over which outages are estimated
The probability of an outage in Section i is given by:
Pi = I- Exp (-E i)
Failure rates and average outage durations are shown in Table 4
from the sources indicated. It should be noted that there are large
uncertainties and variations in both published failure rates and out-
age durations. For example, the rates shown in Table A.4 for open line
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DISTRIBUTION I :_
SUBSTATION CIRCUIT
BREAKER
3_FEEDERPRIMARY _1[
__'_tlb FEED 1 MILE
jPOINT
3_ SUBFEEDER
i1_ SECTIONLATERAL A
SECTIONALIZING
FUSE --_q _ --
SECTION
B 1 MILE
NORMALLY LTO /OPENOTHER _ _ _
CIRCUIT
• 2500 KVA PRIMARY FEEDER-- SINGLEFED RADIAL
• 4 SQ MILE RESIDENTIALAREA, 4000 HOMES
• 16 SUBFEEDERSEACH 1 MILE LONG
• 16 LATERALS EACH 1/2 MILE LONG
• 15 -- 5 KVA DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMERS/MILE ON EACH SUBFEEDER,EACH LATERAL, AND ON PRIMARY
FEEDERPAST FEEDPOINT.
• SUBFEEDERS,LATERALS, AND TRANSFORMERSALLOCATED EQUALLY TO SECTIONA 8 B.
FIGUREA.5. "TYPICAL"DISTRIBUTIONCIRCUIT
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TABLEA.4
FAILURERATESOFVARIOUSDISTRIBUTIONEQUIPMENTS
DISTRIBUTION NO. UNIT- FAILURE OUTAGE SOURCE
EQUIPMENT FAILED HOURS RATE DURATION
Dist. Sta.
- - .012/Yr 4 Hr 1, 3Transformer
Feeder 20 1870 .011/Yr 8 Hr 2, 3Cir. Breaker
Distribution 35 584 .06/Yr 5 Hr 2, 3Sta. Bus
Distribution 10 280 .036/Yr 4 Hr 2, 3
Regulator
Primary - - .07/Mi/Yr 3 Hr 1, 3Feeder
Lateral - - .18/Mi/Yr 2 Hr 1, 3Feeder
Line - - .0007/Yr 1 Hr 3Fuse
Distribution 28 290 .097/Yr 2 Hr 2Transformer
SOURCES:
1 - Power Systems Reliability Calculation (Ref. 10)
2 - Determination and Analysis of Data for Reliability Studies (Ref. 11)
• Field Data from Texas Electric Service, Co.
3 - Reliability Information for Electric Utility Transmission and Distribution Systems
(Ref. 6)
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feeders apparently include little if any consideration of severe wind, ice,
or lightning conditions. Table A.5 provides equipment outage rates for the
various equipments showl, in Figure A.5.
If there were no sectionalizing fuses, all customers would be affected
by all outages and the average outage per customer would be the same as the
total for the circuit, 2.859/year. The annual outage probability per customer
would be:
1 - Exp (-2.859) = 0.94.
Now if the primary sectionalizing fuse is added and coordinated
so as to open for faults in Section B without interrupting customers in
Section A, and if the subfeeder fuses and lateral fuses are omitted, then
all customers would be affected by faults in Section A while only 50% of
the customers would be affected by faults in Section B. This results in:
Section Outages/Year Outage Probability Customers Affected
A 1.50 0.78 100%
B 1.36 0.74 50%
The average annual outages per customer:
= 1.50 X 100% + 1.36 X 50% = 2.18
The annual outage probability per customer is obtained from:
PA_ (100%) + PB_ (50%) + PAB (100%) : (.78) (I-.74) +
(.74) (I-.78) (.50) + (.78) (.74) + 0.86.
If fuses are now added to each subfeeder and each lateral the
following allocation of failure rates, outage probability, and customer
outages results:
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TABLEA. 5
ANNUALOUTAGESFORTYPICALDISTRIBUTIONCIRCUIT
DISTRIBUTION STA. TRANSFORMER = .012/YR
CIRCUIT BREAKER = .011/YR
DIST. FEEDERREGULATOR = .060/YR
MAIN FEED(1 MILE OPEN LINE) = .070/YR
SEC A PRI FEED(1 MILE OPEN LINE) = .070/YR
SEC A SUBFEEDERS(8 MILE OPEN LINE) = .560/YR
SEC A LATERALS (4 MILE OPEN LINE) = .720/YR
SEC A FUSES (12 TOTAL) = .008/YR
TOTAL SECA = 1.500/YR
SEC B PRI FEED(1 MILE OPEN LINE) = .070/YR
SEC B SUBFEEDERS(8 MILE OPEN LINE) = .560/YR .
SEC B LATERALS (4 MILE OPEN LINE) = .720/YR
SEC B FUSES (13 TOTAL) = .009/YR
TOTAL SEC B = 1.359/YR *
TOTAL FOR CIRCUIT = 2.859/YR
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Portion of Outages per Outage Customers
System Year Prob. Affected
Equip. prior to 2.12 0.19 100%
Pri fuse, P
Primary feeder .07 0.07 50%
Section B, b
Each subfeeder, S .07 0.07 40%
Each lateral, L .09 0.09 2%
The average number of annual outages per customer is:
.212 (100%) + .07 (50%) + 16 (.07) (4%) + 16 (.09) (2%) : .32.
The annual outage probability per customer is approximately:
I- Exp (-0.32) : 0.27
Addition of bulk outages to equipment outages results in:
Circuit Configuration Annual Outage Prob. per Customer
(l-RBulk • REquip. )
No Fuse 0.95
Primary sectionalizing fuse 0.87
Subfeeder and Lateral #_oes 0.30
Note that these values apparently understate the outages due to tornadoes,
ice storms, etc.
Distribution Outage Data
Outage data at the distribution circuit level are not generally
available in the published literature. Discussions with various utility
companies indicate that about 5-10 outages per year per distribution cir-
cuit can be expected. The 23KVdistribution circuit described later had
8 outages resulting in a total of about 3700 customer-outages in I0 calen-
dar months.
EFFECTSOFCF ONDISTRIBUTIONCIRCUITS
The exposure of electric utility distribution systems to high con-
centrations of carbon fibers is expected to result in flashovers across
insulators and bushings. Since a large number of insulators will be ex-
posed over a period of time, a series of interruptions can be expected
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to occur. If the time between flashovers exceeds the feeder breaker re-
closing cycle times (adjustable from a few seconds to about 6 minutes), a
series of intermittent interruptions will occur. If a series (burst) of flash-
overs spans the reclosing time, the feeder breaker will lock open. In this
analysis, exposure to CF is assumed to result in an interruption with a
probability determined by the Weibull distribution.
The exposure values expected to result in flashovers are obtained
from Westinghouse Electric Company tests which indicate that the percentage
of insulators failed versus the exposure values can be approximated by the
Weibull function. Somerepresentative values from the Westinghouse data
are contained in Attachment A. Note that large differences in failure
characteristics result from tests on different types of insulators and
different applied voltages.
In the paragraphs which follow, a typical distribution circuit at
7.5KV primary voltage and a selected actual distribution circuit operating
at 23KV are analyzed. The closest applicable insulation types and voltage
are selected from the Westinghouse data using the tests of 2mmfiber "
lengths; the exposure values at 2mmare then linearly extrapolated to
values at the 3-mm fiber lengths assumed for this study.
The maximumexposure value expected to be encountered are less
than 1 x 106 fiber-sec per cubic meter which yield per-insulator failure
probabilities on the order of 1 x 10-8 . The insulator types which occur
in small numbers in a circuit (e.g. circuit breaker bushings) can therefore
be neglected. Exposure values are translated to insulator failure probabili-
ties using the Weibull function with input constants from the Westinghouse
data.
Estimates of customer outages are made based on accidents at the
Los Angeles International Airport assuming (a) first that all circuits
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fit the 7.5KV circuit characteristics and then (b) that all circuits fit
the 23KV circuit characteristics.
Analysis of 7.5 KV Distribution System
The 7.5KV distribution system was described previously and shown
in Figure 5. The failure probabilities are dominated by the pin insula-
tors. If the effects of sectionalizing are neglected, which represents
the worst case, all pin insulators can be considered in series. The
total number of insulators are estimated as follows:
Primary feeder - 2 miles x 240 insulators/mi. = 480
Secondary feeders -16 miles x 240 insulators/mi.= 3840
Lateral feeders - 8 miles x 80 insulators/mi.: 640
Total 4860
Therefore 5000 insulators are assumed to be in the circuit.
Insulator failure probabilities ar_ estimated from the Weibull#
function: [ Q ol I_)]
PFI = 1 -EXP - _o - a _o
PFI = Prob. of failure of a single insulator
_o = Exposure value in fiber-sec per cubic meter
ao = Cut off point on _o
a,B= Welbull constant for the applicable insulator test
data
Uo = _ at fiber length in test, _× = u of desired fiber length
The probability of failure (outage) of an entire circuit with n
insulators in series is equal to:
PFC = 1 _[EXP _((_o _o)(_x))B ] n
The Westinghouse data for the wet 7.5KV pin insulator shows: a=.69 x 108,
B:7.4, _o at 2mm= 5.77 x 107. Using linear extrapolation (see attachment A)
the _× a 3mm= 3.10 x 107. Applying the Weibull function with these
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values at so = o results in the value of failure probability versus exposure
shown in Table A.6.
Accident Scenario. There are expected to be 2.6 aircraft accidents
per year which will result in fiber release. Previous ORI work has shown that
a large release consists of 5 x I0 II fibers. At stability class 6 and a 5.5
meter/sec wind speed the exposure footprints shown in Figure A.6 will result
from each release of 5 x I0 II fibers. Based on our earlier analyses, there
conditions represent the worst case.
Los Angeles International Airport is chosen as an accident site
which represents a severe case from the standpoint of downwind population den-
sities. Data for downwind areas are shown in Table A.7. Each household, busi-
ness, and industry is assumed equal to one utility customer.
The expected number of customer outages may now be obtained as
follows:
=
No Na i (PCi) (Di) (Ai)
where:
No = Number of customer outages per year
Na = Number of accidents per year
PCi = Probability of an outage/customer for exposure to level i
Di = Customer density in exposure level i
Ai = Area covered by exposure level i (per accident)
The values of PCi, Di and Ai are shown in Table A.8. Intersected areas were
obtained by manually comparing footprints versus demographic areas from Table 7.
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TABLEA.6
OUTAGEPROBABILITYVS. EXPOSURELEVELFOR7.5KV CIRCUIT
EXPOSURE FAILURE PROBABILITY
LEVEL 1 INSULATOR ENTIRE CIRCUIT
1 x 103 7.29x 10-11 5.00x 10-7
5x 103 3.64x 10-10 2.00x 10-6
1 x 104 7.29x 10-10 3.50x 10-6
5 x 104 3.64 x 10-9 1.80 x 10-5
1 x 105 6.16x 10-9 3.10x 10-5
2.5 x 105 2.00x 10-8 1.05x 10-4
5x105 3.64x 10-8 1.80x 10-4
1x 106 6.15x 10-5 3.03x 10-2
1 x 107 6.15 x 10-5 2.65 x 10-1
2 x 107 1.03 x 10-2 0.9999...
3x 107 1.88x 10-1 0.9999...
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FIGUREA.6. EXPOSUREFOOTPRINTSFORRELEASEOF 5xlO" SINGLE FIBERS
ANDMETEOROLOGICALCONDITIONSSHOWN
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TABLEA.7
DEMOGRAPHICDATAFORAREADOWNWINDOF LOSANGELESINTERNATIONALIRPORT
DISTANCE
AREA DISTANCE ALONG CUSTOMERS
COUNTY OR CITY SQ. MI. FROM A/P DOWNWIND PER SQ. MI.
AXIS
Los Angeles 4069 0 Mi. 35 Mi. 650SMSA
Orange 782 35 " 30 " 615County
Riverside 71.3 40 " 10 " 230
City
Ontario 32.1 40 " 10 " 671City
.
San Bernadino 20,117 30 " 10 " Urban - 370County Other- 15
Riverside 7176 40 " 180 " 22County
TABLEA.8
INTERSECTEDAREAS(Ai), CUSTOMEROUTAGEPROBABILITY(PCi), ANDCUSTOMERDENSITY
(Di) FORINTERSECTIONOF EXPOSUREFOOTPRINTSWITHAREASFROMTABLE 8.
FOOTPRINT INTERSECTED CUSTOMER CUSTOMER
EXPOSURE SIZE (Mi.) DEMOGRAPHIC OUTAGE DENSITYLEVEL REGION AREA PROB.
Eo L W Area* INTERSECTED Ai PCi Di
5x 105 30 4 37 LosAngeles,SMSA 37Sq. Mi. 1.80x 10-4 650
2.5x 105 66 6 83 LosAngeles 5Sq. Mi. 1.05x 10-4 650
SanBernadino 5 Sq. Mi. 1.05 x 10-4 370County - Urban
RiversideCity 71 Sq. Mi. 1.05 x 10-4 230
RiversideCounty 2 Sq. Mi. 1.05 x 10-4 22
5 x 104 192 20 1093 SanBernadino 365 Sq. Mi. 1.80 x 10-5 15County - Other
RiversideCounty 728 Sq. Mi. 1.80 x 10-5 22
5 x 103 240 36 1557 SanBernadino 519 Sq. Mi. 2.00 x 10-6 15County - Other
RiversideCounty 1038 Sq. Mi. 2.00 x 10-6 22
*Areas are those Portions of Footprints that are Mutually Exclusive.
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Applying the above relations results in the following customer
outages per accident:
Customer
Exposure Level Outage/Customer x Density x Area = Outages
5x105 1.80x10 -4 650 37 4.330
2.5xl 05 1.05xl 0-4 650 5 O.340 "
2.5xl 05 1.05xl 0-4 370 5 O.190
1.05xl 0-4 230 71 1. 710
1.05xlO -4 22 2 0.005
5x104 1.80x10 -5 15 365 0.099
5xl 04 1.80xl 0-5 22 728 O.288
5xl 03 2. OOxl0-6 15 510 O.Ol6
5xl 03 2. OOxl0-6 22 1038 O.046
Total per accident = 9.000
Total per year = 2.6 x 9 = 23.40
This result compares with over 3 million customer outages due to bulk
outages alone. Applying the results of the reliability analysis for the
typical circuit under the samefusing conditions as above yields at least
another 20 million outages per year due to normal distribution system failures.
Analysis of a Selected 23KV Distribution Circuit
Figure A.7 shows a one-line schematic of an actual 23KV distribu-
tion circuit. This circuit serves about 1800 industrial, commercial, and
residential customers in an urban area of about one square mile. This
circuit consists of a 3# radial primary feeder with 3# subfeeders and
laterals together with a few I# laterals as shown. There is no automa-
tic sectionalizing capability except for the fusing of some laterals as
shown. There exists the capability to cross-tie to adjacent circuits at
several points.
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TOoTHER<p.-,_ __NO _b. 700', 2 (1) 1¢r_ 500,, 3 (1) r-.._500',IF"_ 5°°'' 3(1)1{ ) 3q_ (1L 1 {3)
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2 (11
3_ 3_
3(1) _1-_ 0', U.G.. 5 (31 _0', 5 111.2 (31
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OTHER
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0' _ TO OTHER CIRCUIT
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CIRCUIT
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300', I (3)
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• _ 0, U.G., 6 131
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FIGUREA.7. SELECTEDACTUALDISTRIBUTIONCIRCUIT
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31_
--" 3-Phase subfeeder or lateral
3.
_', 113_ X00' is the length of the subfeederor lateralopen wire
circuits
1. H _ H J _ J
10o..U.G.,s=1= U._. -- unoergrouna
X (3) -- Numberof 3_transformer in subfeederor lateral
1*
3oo', 2 (1)
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FIGUREA.7. SHEET C
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Circuits and transformers are summarized below:
Total 3@open lines = 37,000 ft.
Total I_ open lines = 10,300 ft.
Total exposed distribution transformers
3_ = 32
I_ = 116
Total non-exposed distribution transformers
(in underground vaults and in buildings)
3_ = 32
I_ = 40
Normal Reliability. There are about 8-10 normal outages (about
3700 customer-outages) per year on this circuit• This appears to be typi-
cal for the type of circuit (based on discussions with several utilities).
Insulator Failure Probability. The total number of insulators
are estimated from:
7milesof 3_ lines x 240/mile = 1680
2milesof I_ lines x 80/mile = 160
Total : 1840
The 34.5KV distribution post insulators are the closest applicable
insulators, used as line posts for the 23 KV open lines• The Westinghouse
data for this shows m = .19 x 109 B = 1 99 M:2mm= 1 8 x 108 M:3mm(by, • , • ,
linear extrapolation) = 1.0 x 108. Failure probabilities for a single
insulator and for all insulators in series are shown in Table A.9.
Accident Scenario. The same accident scenario is applied as
used previously, 2.6 aircraft accidents each releasing 5 x 1011fibers at
Los Angeles International Airport, and producing the same footprints•
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TABLEA.9
OUTAGEPROBABILITYVS. VARIOUSEXPOSUREL VELSFOR23 KV CIRCUIT
EXPOSURE FAILURE PROBABILITY
LEVEL
1 INSULATOR ENTIRE CIRCUIT
1x 103 1.0x 10"10 1.84x 10-7
5 x 103 3.0 x 10-9 4.60 x 10-6
1x 104 1.0x 10-8 1.80x 10-5
5 x 104 2.4 x 10.7 4.46 x 10.4
1 x 105 9.6 x 10-7 1.42 x 10-3
2.5 x 105 5.9 x 10-6 1.09 x 10-2
5x 105 2.4x 10-5 4.26x 10-2
lx106 9.4x10 -5 .1589
1 x 107 9.1 x 10-3 .9999
2 x 107 3.5 x 10-2 .9999
3 x 107 7.8 x 10-2 .9999
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The Expected Number of Customer Outages are estimated in the same
way as was done previously, producing the following results: Customer
Exposure Level Outage/Customer x Density x Area = Outages
5xlO 5 4.26xi0 -2 650 37 1024.53
2.5xi05 1.09xlO -2 650 5 35.43
1.09xlO -2 370 5 20.17
1.09xlO "2 230 71 178.00
1.09x10 -2 22 2 0.48
5. Oxl04 4.46xi 0-4 15 365 2.44
4.46x10 -4 22 728 7.14
5.0x103 4.60x10 -6 15 519 0.04
4.60xi0 -6 22 1038 0.II
Total per accident : 1268.34
Total per year = 2.6 x 1268.34 = 3298
customer outages per year
From the actual circuit outage data there were 3700 outages for
1800 customers or 2.06 outages per year per customer. For the 97636
customers within the exposure footprints, normal customer outages are
expected to be about 2.06 x 97636 = 2.01 x 105 customer outages. The
ratio of CF/normal outages is: 3298 . 2.01 x 105 = 16/IOOQ for those
affected by CF. Over the entire U.S., the 3298 CF induced outages/year
compares with over 20 million which are expected to occur normally.
CONCLUSION
The carbon fibers appear to present an insignificant problem to
electrical distribution circuits, even when estimates are made using
very pessimistic (worst case) assumptions.
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APPLICATIONOF INSULATORTEST DATA TO POWERDISTRIBUTIONSTUDY
The Westinghouse Electic Company has performed tests on various
types of insulators and bushings at variousapplied voltages and exposed
to various fiber lengths.Theresults of these tests are summarized in
Table A.IO (Westinghouse Table 3.3). Figure A.8 (Westinghouse Figure
3.3-I) shows interpolation of some of these data for various fiber
lengths.
FigureA.8 has beenusedto scalevaluesof _ to 3mm fiberlengths
for thoseinsulatorshownon Figure3.3-I. Insulatorsand bushingsnot
shownon FigureA.8 are assumedto scaleto fiberlengthat the same
rateas the 15 KV C NeckDistributionpostsincethis is the most con-
servativerate indicatedon FigureA.8. The resultsare shownin Table
A.ll.
The values of _ at 3mmare selected for the insulator types and
voltages closest to those representing the distribution systems being
analyzed.
FigureA.9 showsthe valuesof exposure-to-flashoverfor a wet
7o5KVpin insulatorwhileFigureA.lO showsthe valuesof exposure-to-
flashoverfor 34.5KVdistributionpost. Thse figuresand associated
Weibullconstantsare usedas the basisfor failureestimatesmade in
thisstudy(aftertranslationof mean valuesfor 3mm fiberlengths).
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TABLEA.I RESULTSOF TESTS FORSELECTEDINSULATORS
FIBER EXPOSURE CONFIDENCE INTERVAL MINIMUM P < MIN* CONCENTRATIONINSULATOR n LENGTH ABOUT MEAN EXPOSURE P
mm # o 95%
7.5 kV Pin 4 2.0 2.8 x 108 1.3 x 108 1.4 x 108 44% 1.6 x 104
7.5 kV Pin (Wet) 7 2.0 5.8 x 107 2.0x 107 3.4 x 107 </1<7.4 x 107 4.9x 107 28% 1.5 x 104
15 kV C-Neck D. PostVert. 2 2.0 7.3 x 107 3.0x 107 5.2x 107 68% 1.6x 103
15 kV C-Neck D. Post (Wet) 10 2.0 6.2 x 107 1.0x 107 4.7x 107 21% 1.6 x 104
34.5 kV D. PostVert. 5 2.0 1.8 x 108 .9 x 108 1.53 x 108 37% 1.8 x 104
7.5 kVPin 45 4.3 4.1 xl07 4.0x 107 2.6x 107 </l< 5.7 x 107 2.8x 107 5% 1.3x 104
7.5 kVStat. PostVert. 1 4.3 >4.0x108 1.5x 104°°
7.5 kV Star.PostHot. 1 4.3 4.0 x 106 2.1 x 104
7.5 kVPin 15 4.3+9 1.7 x 107 7.6 x 106 1.3 x 107 </j< 2.3 x 107 3.0x 106 14% 8.3 x 103
15 kV C-Neck D. PostVert. 26 4.3+9 2.9 x 106 2.6x 106 2.0 x 106 </l< 3.0 x 106 8.7 x 105 8% 6.7 x 103
7.5 kVPin 52 9.0 4.8 x 106 2.9 x 106 3.7 x 106 <_< 5.3 x 107 1.6x 106 6% 5.0 x 103
15 kV Pin Cap 14 9.0 2.1 x 106 5.9 x 105 1.3 x 106 15% 2.5 x 103
7.5 kV Stat. PostVert. 10 9.0 1.2 x 107 1.2x 107 4.3x 106 </l< 2.47 x 107 1.6x 106 21% 4.3x 103
7.5 kV Stat. PostHor. 5 9.0 3.4 x 107 2.3 x 107 1.2 x 107 37% 6.9 x 103
34.5 kV Stat. PostVert. 9 9.0 4.9 x 107 4.7 x 107 1.3x 106 23% 12.2 x 103
! 5 kV Fostoria Insulator 4 9.0 8.4 x 106 6.6 x 106 2.9 x 106 44% 2.0 x 103OJ
-I_ 5 kV Trans.BushingVert. 5 9.0 3.8 x 106 7.9 x 105 7.5 x 106 37% 1.2 x 103
15 kV Trans. BushingVert. 16 9.0 1.0 x 106 3.3 x 105 6.0 x 105 13% 1.3 x 103
5 kV Trans. BushingHor. 6 9.0 2.3 x 106 7.1 x 105 1.3 x 106 32% 1.0 x 103
15 kV C-Neck D. PostVert. 15 9.0 1.2x 106 4.0x 105 9.0x 105 <_< 1.4 x 106 5.6x 105 14% 1.2x 103
15 kV C-Neck D. Post Hor. 15 9.0 1.8x 106 6.0x 105 5.6x 105 14% 1.6x 103
34.5 kV D. PostVert. 18 9.0 9.5 x 105 6.4 x 105 5.1x 105 <#< 1.3x 106 3.0x 105 12% 9.2 x 102
7.5 kV SuspensionVert. 13 9.0 7.9 x 106 4.8 x 106 2.7x 106 16% 2.9 x 103
7.5 kVPin 17 ,9.0 + 12.0 5.0 x 106 3.2 x 106 3.3 x 106 </1< 6.5 x 106 2.3 x 106 13% 4.5 x 103
34.5 kVD. PostVert. 15 9.0+12.0 8.0x105 2.8x105 6.4x105</l<9.8x105 3.0x105 14% 1.1x103
7.5 kVPin 15 10.5 6.5x 105 2.4x 105 5.1 x 105</1<7.8x 105 2.6x 105 14% 8.6x 102
7.5 kV Stat. PostVert. 20 10.5 4.5 x 106 4.3 x 106 2.35 x 106 <#<4.7 x 106 1.2x 106 11% 4.6 x 103
15 kV C-Neck Dist. PostVert. 15 10.5 5.2 x 105 3.18x 105 3.5 x 105 </_< 6.2 x 105 2.4x 105 14% 6.3 x 102
34.5 kV Dist.Post 16 10.5 2.2 x 105 1.2x 105 1.5 x 105 </_< 2.7 x 105 1.5x 105 13% 5.2 x 102
• Like!ihoodofa flashoverto occuratanexposureoflessthantheminimum,with90%confidence.
** Thisinsulatorflashedonlyaftergivenexposureandtwiceratedvoltage.
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FIGURE A.8 LINEAR INTERGEOLATION OF EXPOSURE TO FIBER LENGTH
TABLEA.11
ESTIMATESOF E AT
3 MMFIBERLENGTH
INSULATOR
7.5 KV Pin Insulator(Dry) 1.5 x 108
7.5 KV PinInsulator (Wet) 3.1 x 107
15 KV C-Neck D. PostVert. 2.5 x 107
15 KV C-Neck D, PostVert. (Wet) 2.1 x 107
34.5 KV C-Neck D. PostVert. 1 x 108
7.5 KV Station PostVert. 4.4 x 108
7.5 KV Station PostHor. 1.2 x 109 _.
5 KV Trans. Bushing Vert. 9.5 x 107
15 KV Trans. Bushing Vert. 2.5x 107
5 KV Trans. Bushing Hor. 5.8 x 107
7.5 KV SuspensionVert. 2.0 x 108
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APPENDIXB
TOTALAIRCRAFTACCIDENTCOSTS
ORI utilizeda 1978 FAA report_/ and historicalrecords from the
National TransportationSafety Board (NTSB) in determiningthe costs of major
airplaneaccidentsof the past ten years. These costs were used as the basis
for a comparisonof the additionalrisks (costs)presentedby the use of
carbon fiberswith the accepted costs associatedwith major airplaneaccidents
of the recent past.
The ORI costingmethodologyconsideredonly two items: aircraft
hull damage and costs of personalinjuriesto crew, passengersand persons
on the ground. Other costs such as investigativecosts, propertydamage to
ground structures,and other incidentalcosts were not included.
Subsetsof the entire NTSB aircraftaccidentfile (1966-1975)were
drawn in order to comparecarbon fiber relatedcosts to the costs of an
appropriatepopulationof past accidents. It was decidedthat this appropriate
populationwould be those earlieraccidentswhich were on similarscales in
terms of aircrafttype and accident severityas the future accidentscould
conceivablyresult in carbon fiber release. Only accidentswhich involved
U.S. commericaltransportjets of significantsize were includedin the analysis.
These aircraftcloselyapproximatethe types of planeswhich will be flying
with carbon fibers. All the recordedaccidentsinvolvedone of the following
aircraft:
I__/WilliamL. Fallon,Cost Analysis of AircraftAccidents,FAA Officeof
Aviation System Plans, June 1978.
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Small Jets Medium Jets Large Jets
(150 passengers) (150-260passengers) (260 passengers)
BAC-IlI DC-8-61 B-747
B-707 DC-8-62 DC-I0 ::
B-720 DC-8-63 L lOll
B-727
B-737
DC-8 (non 60's series)
DC-9
In addition to aircraftsize and type, the severityof the accidentswas
taken into account. Only those NTSB file entriesin which the fuselagehad
been labelled as being "destroyed"or having "substantial"damage were retained.
This strategywas required in order to excludeminor incidentscontainedin
the NTSB file. These less calamitousaccidentsmay be as small as a person-
al injury caused during strong air turbulenceand were excluded so as not to
reduce the significanceof the individualaccidentsin which partialor total
fuselagedestructionoccurred. The restrictionsthese limitationsproduced
reducedthe original1966-1975file size from 560 accessi_blecommercial
aircraft accident files to 155 jet accidentswith the proper accident
severitylevels (16 large jets, 0 medium jets, 149 small jets).
For hull cost computation,the sellingprice of an identicalair-
craft in the accidentyear was culled from printoutsdocumentingthe cited
FAA study. The original sourceof this informationwas publicallyavailable
recordsof commercialtransactionssuch as those containedin Aviation Week.
No individualconsiderationwas given to specialavionicsor other equipment.
One hundred percentof the replacementcost was assignedto those hulls which
were "destroyed";one third of the ocst was assignedto the substantially
damagedaircraft. The FAA developedthe one third factor throughconsulta-
tions with NTSB and industryexperts.
On the subjectof personalinjury costs, $300,000was selectedas the
the cost of a fatal injury.
The $300,000was based on the projectionof non-WarsawPact air-
craft accidentclaims settlements,as reportedby the Civil AeronauticsBoard.
The figure has been endorsed by the AssociatedAviation Underwriters,and is
B-2
used by the agency (FAA) in its cost benefitwork in facilityestablishment
criteria. Serious injury is $45,000based on _Ftual settlement;minor injury
cost is $6,000 based on recognizedmethodology:.
In all cases the injury values and aircraft replacementcosts have
been convertedto 1974 dollars.
The followingtables (TableB.l and B.2) present the resultsof this
analysis by jet size. The word "Significant"in the titles refers to the
accident severitybeing substantialor worse. (Note: There are no accidents
in the medium jet categorywhich fit all the requirements.) A few cases with
extremelylarge personal injury costs are seen to dominatethe upper range of
the total cost figures. These are those truly disastrousaccidentsin which
a large number of deaths takes place.
2/ Fallon,op. cit.
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TABLEB.I SIGNIFICANT1966-1975SMALLJETACCIDENTCOSTSUMMARY
Number of Cases
Personal Aircraft Total
Cost in Thousands Injury Only Damage Only ' Costs
0 73 0 0
1 - 1,000 41 II I0
1,001 - 2,000 4 52 58
2,001 - 3,000 0 43 34
3,001 - 4,000 3 II 6
4,001 - 5,000 0 6 2
5,001 - 6,000 3 4 3
6,001 - 7,000 0 7 3
7,001 - 8,000 l 2 2
8,001 - 9,000 0 0 2
9,001 - lO,O00 0 l 0
lO,OOl - 20,000 5 2 9
20,001 - 30,000 7 0 5
30,001 - 40,000 2 0 4
0 0 l40,001 - 50,000 _
Total 139 139 139
Number of Cases - 139
Worst Case (PersonalInjuryOnly) - $34,140",000
Worst Case (AircraftDamage Only) - $12,000,000
Worst Case (Total)- $40,390,000
Average Case (PersonalInjury Only) - $2,546,000
Average Case (AircraftDamage Only) - $2,550,000
AverageCase (Total)- $5,096,000
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TABLE B.2 SIGNIFICANT1966-1975LARGE JET ACCIDENT COST SUMMARY
Numberof Cases
Personal Aircraft Total
Cost in Thousands InjuryOnly DamageOnly Costs
0 9 0 0
l - l 000 6 0 0
l,OOl - 2 000 0 0 0
2,001 - 3 000 0 0 0
3,001 - 4 000 0 0 0
4,001 - 5 000 0 0 0
5,001 - 6 000 0 5 5
6,001 - 7 000 0 9 7
7,001 - 8 000 0 0 2
8,001 - 9 000 0 0 0
9,001 - lO 000 0 0 0
lO,OOl - 20 000 0 l 0
20,001 - 30 000 0 l l
30,001- 40 000 !I 0 0
40,001 - 50000 0 0 l
Total 16 16 16
Number of Cases - 16
Worst Case (PersonalInjuryOnly) - $32,502,000
Worst Case (AircraftDamageOnly) - $27,000,000
Worst Case (Total)- $49,002,000
AverageCase (PersonalInjuryOnly) $2,149,000
Average Case (AircraftDamage Only) $8,180,000
Average Case (Total)- $I0,329,000
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